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ABSTRACT 
 
HAK-SEON LEE: Inter-sectoral Goods and Labor Market Relationships, International 
Capital Mobility, and US Trade Politics in the 1980s 
(Under the direction of Timothy J. McKeown) 
 
This research undertakes a specific-factors analysis of trade politics in a world of cross-
border capital mobility and finds that inter-sectoral goods market relationships, as well as 
labor mobility, do influence the patterns of industry lobbying for trade protection when 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the US. I study inter-sectoral goods markets by 
exploiting input-output tables on the structure of the American economy prepared 
periodically by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. Commerce Department. I show 
that sales or purchase dependencies affect a sector’s lobbying for trade protection when 
“neighboring” sectors receive FDI. I also show that the level of inter-sectoral labor mobility 
affects industry lobbying because FDI-receiving sectors usually pull labor from other sectors. 
Industry lobbying for trade protection is measured by (1) financial contributions to the 
political campaigns of members of Congress who vote for a protectionist bill; and (2) 
petitions filed with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) requesting anti-
dumping or countervailing duties during the five Congressional periods (1981 – 1990). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Economic Globalization and Domestic Politics 
 
The interaction between international and domestic politics has been a primary issue 
for students of the international political economy (IPE). It has been said that domestic 
politics can be both a cause and a consequence of international politics (Gourevitch 1978). 
How can a country influence international politics? Political realists posit that when the 
world economy is dominated by a hegemon, the international economic system is more likely 
to be open and stable (Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1987).1 After two world 
wars, the US, having become the sole economic hegemon, restructured the world economic 
system by initiating multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2  
How could changes in world politics influence a society’s domestic politics? Since 
the 1970s, the world economy has been characterized by an unprecedented level of economic 
globalization processes driven by growing international trade, capital flows and relocation of 
production. And it has been argued that economic globalization exerts profound effects on an 
individual economy’s domestic politics (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Garrett 1998; Kahler 
                                                 
1
 This argument is so-called the hegemonic stability theory. 
 
2
 Liberals posit that, even after a hegemon declines, international institutions help maintain a stable and open 
world economic system (Ruggie 1983; Keohane 1984, 1989).    
 2  
 
 
and Lake 2003). Since economic globalization creates opportunities or constraints for various 
domestic actors, it affects the actors’ policy preferences (Keohane and Miller 1996). Could 
the globalized economy, then, influence domestic politics in the US, still the largest national 
economy in the world? If so, what external sources could modify US domestic politics? Even 
before the current wave of globalization processes, the US economy had constantly 
interacted with the world economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And, 
depending on the level of trade openness, there have been always winners and losers among 
various economic actors in the US (Hiscox 2002). Then what could be a “new” external 
source of modification in US trade politics? One of the most prominent changes in recent 
decades was increased inward foreign direct investment (FDI) into the US. Unlike previous 
decades in the twentieth century, since the 1980s, the US has become a net cross-border 
investment receiver instead of a sender (Graham and Krugman 1995; Kang 1997). Since 
most inward FDI stays within the US, it is reasonable to suspect that this investment has had 
an impact on US domestic politics.      
This research focuses on how increasing inward FDI affected the patterns of US 
industry lobbying during the 1980s. Why do I care about the effects from inward FDI? When 
foreign firms engage in direct investment in US industries, the investment induces 
modifications in corporate ownership structure and industry goods production between 
domestic and foreign firms. These modifications after inward FDI imply new business 
environments, which provide new opportunities or constraints for US industries. In response, 
US industries will modify their political activities, pursuing more favorable government 
policies.3 Thus, based on the so-called interest group politics model, this research assumes 
                                                 
3
 An important assumption is that economic actors lobby when they calculate that the benefits from provided 
policies will be greater than the costs of lobbying activities.    
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that economic actors pressure the government, seeking policies favorable to the fortunes of 
the economic actors.  
    
1.2 Structure of Inter-industry Goods Market Relationships 
 
Students of the IPE have examined how given trade regimes (e.g., the imposition of 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers) could trigger cross-border direct investment flows. The 
discussion of so-called “tariff-jumping” FDI implies that newly established tariffs in a local 
economy will lead multinational corporations (MNC) to engage in direct investment to gain 
access to the local market (Hamada 1974; Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977).  
Other researchers have examined how an exogenous increase in international capital 
flows affects a domestic society’s trade politics. Goodman et al. (1996) find that foreign 
firms advocate free trade when they engage in import-complementing FDI to ease imports 
from their home countries. Yet the foreign firms demand protection against other foreign 
exporters once their local production substitutes previous imports from their home countries. 
Chase (1998) argues that sectors receiving large stocks of inward FDI engage in less 
lobbying for trade protection since protectionist rents from trade barriers should fall once 
foreign firms begin to produce locally. By contrast, Zeng and Sherman (2005) argue that 
inward FDI increases industry demand for trade protection because foreign investment poses 
a competitive challenge to domestic firms. Unlike these studies, which deal with a given 
sector’s reaction to FDI in its own sector, Hiscox (2004) investigates how a given sector 
would respond to FDI in other sectors, and finds that the increasing cross-border capital 
 4  
 
 
mobility in some sectors should increase lobbying incentives for specific capital owners in 
other sectors, which may lose labor to the FDI-receiving sectors.   
In order to gain a more complete picture of the causal relationship between inward 
FDI and industry lobbying, this research focuses on inter-industry business structure, which 
indicates input-output goods sales relationships between upstream and downstream 
industries. Why do I care about inter-industry structure? Since the structure represents the 
level of “closeness” between industries in goods sales connections, it also implies the degree 
of inter-industry “dependencies.” An upstream sector that sells a larger portion of its total 
shipments to a downstream sector is highly dependent upon the downstream sector. Another 
upstream sector that sells a small amount of its total sales to a downstream sector is less 
dependent upon the downstream sector. Once corporate ownership structure and industry 
production change after foreign firms engage in FDI and produce in a local sector, other 
sectors will experience different levels of impacts on their business fortunes because there 
are various levels of goods sales (or purchase) dependencies between the FDI-receiving 
sector and the other sectors. Hence the level of inter-industry dependencies will determine 
the degree of industry sensitivity to inward FDI in neighboring sectors. Should inward FDI 
and inter-industry business structure have a negative (or positive) impact on an industry’s 
fortune, the industry will modify its lobbying activities, seeking the most favorable 
government policies.  
Assume that foreign automobile companies begin to produce in the US and gain 
domestic market share. Then the foreign investment should affect the fortunes of automobile 
parts suppliers in different ways depending on their sales dependencies upon the automobile 
industry. Consider domestic suppliers that are highly dependent upon the FDI-receiving 
 5  
 
 
automobile industry. If foreign automobile companies producing in the US procure inputs 
from their parent firms or home country suppliers rather than US suppliers (as MNCs usually 
do when they engage in FDI), US suppliers will face a negative demand shock, all else equal. 
Then the harmed US suppliers will devote resources to lobbying since they have a stake in 
blocking imported inputs sold to the automobile industry.4 On the other hand, suppliers that 
are less dependent upon the automobile industry will not see much direct impact from inward 
FDI in the automobile industry, and thus will not respond in a substantial way. Hence 
varying degrees of inter-industry goods sales dependencies should bring different levels of 
responses from various sectors when a given sector receives inward FDI. I measure industrial 
responses by two direct measurements of industry lobbying for trade protection: industrial 
campaign contributions to protectionist candidates for the US House of Representatives and 
industry petitions filed with the US International Trade Commission (ITC).  
 
1.3 Inter-industry Labor Mobility  
 
Another main topic of this research is how inter-industry labor mobility can affect 
industry lobbying in trade politics when other sectors receive FDI and expand production. 
Various manufacturing sectors employ different types and levels of skilled labor, which 
affects the “stickiness” of labor mobility across sectors. If a given sector employs less sector-
specific skilled labor, then the sector will have a relatively high level of labor mobility since 
its labor can be compatible with other sectors that also do not require highly sector-specific 
                                                 
4
 The assumption is that when FDI occurs, the effected sectors have a purely “political” reaction and do not 
respond by changing some aspects of their business -- at the extreme, exiting from production. Also, I assume 
that the political effort by the sector receiving FDI is not changed by the FDI, and the foreign firm sending the 
FDI also does not change its own political effort.  
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skills.5 Then that type of labor is more mobile across sectors, all else equal. On the contrary, 
if a given sector employs highly sector-specific skilled labor, then the sector will have a 
relatively low level of labor mobility since its labor cannot be compatible with other sectors. 
Then sector-specific labor is less mobile across sectors, all else constant. The level of inter-
industry labor mobility is important in trade politics since when some sectors receive FDI 
and expand production, they tend to pull labor from other sectors. This logic comes from 
Jones (1971) and Hiscox (2004), who employ a two-sector and three-factor model that 
assumes that two types of capital are specific to each sector, respectively, but that labor is 
mobile between sectors in an economy.6 While they assume that labor is uniformly mobile, I 
presume that a given sector’s level of labor mobility will be substantially different from that 
of other sectors. And, when FDI-receiving sectors pull labor from other sectors, the level of 
labor mobility matters because some sectors will be more likely to lose labor than others.  
I predict that sectors that employ less sector-specific skilled labor and thus have a 
high level of labor mobility will be more likely to lobby if other sectors receive FDI and 
draw labor from them to expand production, all else constant, because the loss of labor to 
other sectors will result in less production and less profits, all else equal. By contrast, sectors 
that employ highly sector-specific skilled labor and have a relatively low level of labor 
mobility will be less likely to lobby when other sectors receive FDI and pull labor from other 
parts of the economy, all else equal. Capital owners who employ highly sector-specific 
skilled labor need not worry about losing labor to investment-receiving sectors. Thus, various 
degrees of labor mobility caused by different levels of sector-specific labor skills will work 
as a source of industrial political activities when FDI flows into other sectors. 
                                                 
5
 This assumes that the supply of unskilled labor exceeds the supply of appropriately skilled labor.   
 
6
 One type of capital is mobile across borders, while the other is not.  
 7  
 
 
 
1.4 Research Organization  
 
In summary, this research will investigate how inward FDI and the structure of inter-
industry connections, as well as labor mobility, can influence the evolution of the demand 
side of trade politics in the US.7 The research takes place in three steps: first, it considers 
how foreign investors' participation interacts with inter-sectoral goods and labor market 
relationships among US manufacturing sectors; second, it considers how these interactions 
influence a given sector’s lobbying efforts for trade protection; finally, it considers how these 
political demands may help modify US trade policies.8 When trade policy changes but 
institutions do not, the proximate cause of the modification may be changing industrial 
structure after FDI flows into the US. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two reviews the literature on 
interest group politics, cross-border capital flows and trade politics. Chapter Three presents 
the theory and hypotheses regarding inter-sectoral goods market relationships and labor 
mobility. Chapter Four discusses designs for empirical tests, presenting estimation, variables 
and data sources. Chapter Five presents the results of statistical analyses. Chapter Six 
concludes and discusses the political implications of this research. 
                                                 
7
 Many factors influence the evolution of trade politics. This research does not argue that foreign direct 
investment is the most important factor that affects trade politics. Instead, it posits that FDI can be another 
source in the modification of trade policies.  
    
8
 This research does not investigate the final modification of trade policies provided by the government. It 
mainly focuses on the demand side of trade politics, rather than the supply side.     
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter draws findings from the extant international political economy literature 
on the topic of the demand side of trade politics with and without cross-border capital flows. 
Given that existing studies have dealt with the relationships between trade politics and 
international capital flows, the findings from previous works will help analyze how inter-
industry structure affects industry lobbying in the era of cross-border capital flows. I discuss 
the existing literature on FDI politics as well in order to explain why I focus on industry 
lobbying on trade policies rather than lobbying on FDI policies.    
 
2.1 Interest Group Politics Without Cross-border Capital Mobility 
 
The demand side of trade politics is basically concerned with why firms or industries 
demand protection and how the interest groups manifest their demands (Goodman et al. 
1996).9 Actors in the demand side of trade politics include societal groups and political 
leaders. Societal groups include import-competing producers, export-oriented producers, 
foreign exporters, and trade unions. Political leaders include elected executives, bureaucrats, 
or members of legislatures who participate in policy-making processes in trade issues.  
                                                 
9
 Protection in trade politics is a broad term including both tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade 
(Lavergne 1983). Import quotas, subsidies, and a variety of trade restrictions are examples of NTBs, which are 
more difficult to measure than tariff levels.    
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This research assumes that the government supplies liberal or protectionist trade 
policies in response to demands from economic actors.10 The extent to which the government 
provides protection to societal actors is a function of the demands made by the domestic 
interest groups.11 Interest groups seek to influence the political process in ways that promote 
their own interests (Grossman and Helpman 2002).12 They spend resources for lobbying only 
if government plays an important role in their industry and if the expected benefits of 
influencing policy outweigh the costs of lobbying (Stigler 1971; Pittman 1977).13 These 
actors are predominantly producers rather than consumers since the well-organized interests 
of pressure groups will receive benefits from the political process at the expense of final 
consumers, who have diffuse interests (Schattschneider 1935; Nelson 1988).14 A protectionist 
measure provides large benefits to a small number of interest groups and causes a great 
number of consumers a slight loss (Pareto 1927).15 If consumers are sophisticated and 
                                                 
10
 In the interest group politics model, political institutions are considered as “either captives of special interest 
groups or conduits of social pressure” (O’Halloran 1994). The pressure groups model directly links economic 
conditions and interest group demands to policy outcomes. 
   
11
 Lavergne (1983) points out that the essence of interest group politics is that the government responds 
opportunistically to political leverage. According to Schattschneider (1935), the tariff obtained by an industry is 
a function of the degree of pressure that the industry was able to organize. 
  
12
 Setting politicians as maximizing agents who pursue their own selfish interests rather than as benevolent 
agents seeking to maximize aggregate welfare, Grossman and Helpman (1994) argue that the manner of 
campaign and party financing in democratic countries creates powerful incentives for politicians to “peddle” 
their influence. According to them, the structure of trade protection reflects the outcome of a competition for 
political favors. This shows that incumbent politicians seek to get support from interest groups, and interest 
groups lobby not just electoral candidates, but also incumbent officeholders. 
 
13
 In US trade politics, Congress is primarily responsible for regulating commerce with other nations. Since 
Congress is a decentralized institution, it is susceptible to organized pressures (Destler 1995).  
 
14
 In this process, benefits are concentrated while costs are distributed. The pressures from domestic groups that 
had special economic interests were responsible for the highest tariffs in US history, under the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act in the 1930s (Schattschneider 1935).  
   
15
 As a result, trade barriers that benefit specific producers at the expense of a large number of consumers lower 
the standard of living of a society on the whole.   
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concentrated, as business purchasers might be, then a consumer’s interest would be more 
likely to be expressed through an organized interest group action.    
There are two main interest group models in trade politics: the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem and the Ricardo-Viner theorem. The first is called a factoral model, and the second a 
sectoral model. Without considering cross-border movements of capital or labor, the Stolper-
Samuelson (1941) theorem assumes that factors of production can be mobile across sectors in 
a domestic economy. The theorem posits that an increase in the price of a product would 
more than proportionally increase the return to the factor that is intensively used in the 
production of that product. And if there are just two factors, the theorem suggests that the 
real income of the owners of the other factor, which is not intensively used in the production 
of the product, will fall (Alt and Gilligan 1994). Since factors are assumed to be perfectly 
“mobile” between sectors in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, owners of the same factor will 
have similar returns across an economy regardless of the industry in which it is employed. 
Therefore, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that the conflicting economic interest 
line among economic actors is between the owners of factors of production (i.e., capital 
versus labor). The theorem has an implication to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which posits 
that a country will export a good that intensively uses the factor that is relatively abundant in 
the society. If we combine the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem with Stolper-Samuelson, we can 
predict that, in a relatively capital-abundant country, the owners of labor will favor protection 
because it cannot be intensively used in exports, while the owners of capital will favor free 
trade. By contrast, in a relatively labor-abundant country, capital owners will favor protection 
and labor will favor free trade (Alt et. al. 1996).  
 11  
 
 
Another conventional theoretical approach in trade politics is the Ricardo-Viner 
theorem, which assumes that all factors (or at least one factor) are specific to an industry in 
which they are employed (Jones 1971; Samuelson 1971).16 If a country faces an increase of 
imports, then an import-competing industry of that country suffers due to decreased sales and 
profits, all else equal. The Ricardo-Viner theorem assumes that sector-specific capital in that 
import-competing industry cannot move to export-oriented industries, while labor can.17 If 
the import-competing industry loses labor, its productivity declines, and all factors employed 
in the industry have lower income than before. By contrast, an exporting industry can have 
higher productivity because it has more labor from the import-competing industry, and both 
factors of the exporting industry may have higher income than before. Thus, in the specific 
factors model, there is a zero-sum conflict of interest between export-oriented and import-
competing sectors: whichever gains, the other loses (Alt and Gilligan 1994). For this reason, 
the Ricardo-Viner theorem implies that lobbying activities in trade politics occur along sector 
lines (i.e., import-competing versus export-oriented industries) since all the factors employed 
in the former and all the factors employed in the latter have contrasting interests. While the 
owners of factors in import-competing sectors prefer protection, those in export-oriented 
sectors do not.18  
                                                 
16
 While Jones (1971) called it the specific-factors model, Samuelson (1971) labeled it the Ricardo-Viner 
model. 
 
17
 Even though the Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes perfect mobility of factors and the Ricardo-Viner 
model assumes complete specificity of factors, this is only for convenience in modeling. In reality, the level of 
mobility of each factor should be somewhere between perfect mobility and complete specificity (Hiscox 2001, 
2002). 
 
18
 Industry-level pressure groups include industry-based labor unions and management associations. 
Meanwhile, an example of a class-based organization is national federations of labor unions (e.g., the AFL-CIO 
in the US).  
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Students of international political economy have debated over which of these two 
approaches is more appropriate when analyzing trade politics. Rogowski (1989) supports the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem by claiming that factor endowments of different countries trigger 
increasing class conflict or urban-rural conflict when they are more exposed to international 
trade.19 Magee, Brook and Young (1989) argue that a factoral approach better predicts long-
term US trade policy, suggesting that the Democratic Party, which is under lobby from labor, 
is pro-labor and pro-protection, while the Republican Party, which is under lobby from 
capital, is pro-capital and pro-free trade. According to them, labor and capital in the US 
economy have contrasting interests in the long run, and, as a result, their lobbying activities 
occur along factor lines, confirming the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.20 However, in the short 
run, most factors of production are “caught” in their current activity to some degree, and 
short-term fluctuations of returns are more politically relevant than class-based longer-term 
changes. Hence, the sectoral or specific-factor approach will be more relevant in the short run 
(Frieden 1991).21 In contrast to this “time” element that explains the relative appropriateness 
of the Stolper-Samuelson or the Ricardo-Viner models, Alt and Gilligan (1994) argue that the 
sectoral model would work even in the long run if certain factor owners can have political 
“voice, ” which influences trade policy-making in favor of the factor owners. If lobbying 
costs are less than the benefits from specific policies, certain factor owners would support the 
politicians who have incentives to adopt the policies beneficial to the owners. Thus, even in 
                                                 
19
 Midford (1993) and Scheve and Slaughter (1998) also affirm the factoral model. 
 
20
 Magee, Brook and Young (1989) undertake three additional tests to examine which approach has more 
explanatory power. The tests actually suggest the superiority of the Ricardo-Viner over the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. However, the authors do not reject the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, arguing that the theorem is a long-
term proposition.  
      
21
 Lobbying activities in US trade politics is a relatively short-term phenomenon since US trade bills are subject 
to renewal every three to five years (Magee, Brook and Young 1989). 
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the long run, the sectoral model has explanatory power if the owners of certain factors have 
incentives to exert political pressures.22 Another attempt to resolve the controversy between 
factoral and sectoral approaches comes from Alt el al. (1996), who suggest that factor 
mobility is a matter of degree: the more costly it is for factor owners to shift out of an import-
competing sector, the greater their support for protection will be, all else equal.23  
Between the two approaches, this research is based on the assumption of sectoral 
approaches that factors of production are relatively specific to sectors. Yet my focus on the 
structure of inter-industry goods sales dependencies makes this research distinct from 
conventional sectoral approaches that emphasize fault lines between import-competing and 
export-oriented sectors. 
How would local trade politics develop in sectoral approaches? In the domestic 
market, import-competing local producers and foreign exporters compete for a share of the 
market for a single good (e.g., color televisions or automobiles). What preferences do 
domestic producers have over trade policies? If the domestic producers can compete well 
with imports, they would not demand protection since they do not have to spend resources 
for protectionist lobbying. By contrast, as foreign competitors begin to take a higher 
domestic market share, domestic producers feel more threatened by the foreign exporters and 
expend more resources to demand protection (Marks and McArthur 1990). In other words, 
import-competing producers seek protectionist measures to maximize profitability when they 
are faced with severe foreign competition. Thus, a source of demand for protection can be 
                                                 
22
 In the Ricardo-Viner model, the purpose of political action for protection is to keep factor returns high in a 
particular factor owner’s specific industry. By contrast, in the Stolper-Samuelson model, the purpose is to keep 
a particular factor owner’s return high in all industries in an economy (Alt and Gilligan 1994). 
 
23
 Along this line, Alt et al. (1996) argue that “eclecticism” employing both sectoral and factoral models is 
needed to explain the working of international trade because each model is correct in some way, depending 
upon circumstances. 
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foreign competitors’ market share in the domestic market.24 In a similar vein, Lavergne 
(1983) argues that the comparative disadvantage of industries should be positively related to 
demand for protection, and domestic producers with weaker competitive positions globally 
demand protection.  
Other domestic producers with international interests would prefer free trade as these 
interests become crucial for their business (Helleiner 1977; Fong 1983; Milner 1988).25 
Firms that substantially export a single good and purchase inputs from overseas would favor 
free trade for those goods. They fear that foreign governments would retaliate if trade 
barriers were established in the home market, and such barriers would yield them few or no 
benefits in any event. Moreover, they are concerned about whether their input costs will rise 
as a result of trade restrictions on inputs. For example, Destler and Odell (1987) found that 
industries highly dependent on exporting their own goods and importing intermediate goods 
have been against trade protection. In an attempt to explain trade liberalization since the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), Gilligan (1997) argues that US exporters lobby 
for trade liberalization because reciprocal reduction of trade barriers between the US and 
foreign countries concentrates benefits to the specific exporters, who can overcome the 
collective action problems among pro-liberalization groups. In sum, import-competing firms 
or industries are subject to demand protection, while export-oriented firms or industries tend 
to prefer lower or no trade barriers. Thus, in the baseline condition with no cross-border 
                                                 
24
 Levels of protection may vary with fluctuation of economic conditions. For example, business cycle models 
link aggregate economic conditions to levels of protection. The models posit that, since lobbying requires 
organizational and information costs, industries demand higher levels of protection when income gains increase 
and lobbying costs decrease. In times of economic downturn, industries spend more resources to demand 
protection, and in times of economic prosperity, they spend less resource (McKeown 1984; Cassing et al. 1986). 
       
25
 Frieden and Rogowski (1996) argue that reductions in the costs of international trade due to development of 
technology and transportation have increased the opportunity costs of protection, and this “exogenous easing of 
international trade (internationalization)” creates pressures for freer trade.    
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capital investment, the level of trade barriers can be set through the political system in 
response to various domestic producers’ preferences over trade policies.26 
The standard conclusion of the baseline model needs to be modified when domestic 
producers demand “strategic”27 trade policies -- demanding trade barriers for the domestic 
market if foreign markets are protected.28 This is strategic in that domestic firms’ support for 
free trade or protection can be contingent on the behavior of foreign firms and their 
governments (Milner and Yoffie 1989). Thus, firms that were committed to unconditional 
free trade (i.e., internationally oriented firms) could resort to strategic trade demands if the 
domestic market is open to foreign exporters while trade barriers exist abroad and the 
domestic market is sufficiently large that denying it to foreigners imposes a noticeable cost 
on them. In this situation, the export-oriented firms at home support protectionist measures 
domestically to pressure foreign countries to open their markets (Milner and Yoffie 1989).   
The discussion of factoral or sectoral approaches in domestic trade politics and the 
theories of strategic trade demand assume a baseline condition in which no substantial cross-
border direct investment occurs. Factors of production may be mobile or rather specific, but 
only within a given domestic economy. However, if domestic firms are successful in 
obtaining protection from the government, foreign competitors may invest directly to have 
                                                 
26
 A number of scholars focus on the supply side of trade politics and argue that political institutions, rather than 
economic actors’ preferences or demands, are crucial in explaining trade policy (Destler 1986; Haggard 1988; 
Baldwin 1986; Goldstein 1993; O’Halloran 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Rodrik 1995; Verdier 1998). 
Other scholars pay attention to personal preferences and ideas of policymakers or politicians in the trade policy-
making processes (Goldstein 1988; Krueger 1997). This research focuses only on the demand side of trade 
politics rather than on the supply side of trade politics, assuming that political institutions are constant at least in 
short-term.      
   
27
 A strategic situation is defined as one in which “one participant to gain ends is dependent to an important 
degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make” (Schelling 1960). 
 
28
 This means reciprocity in opening domestic and foreign markets. Reciprocity can be defined as “exchanges of 
roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in 
such a way that good is returned for good and bad for bad”(Keohane 1986). 
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access to the local market.29 Hence the baseline condition will disappear if foreign investors 
participate in the host economy through local production.30 In the next section of this chapter, 
I discuss existing literature on the interaction between cross-border capital mobility and 
domestic trade politics.  
 
 
 
2.2 Cross-border Capital Mobility and Trade Politics 
 
The basic framework for analyzing cross-border direct investment and local trade 
politics consists of actors and changing environments that are developed by the actors’ 
activities. The actors include: domestic firms that receive foreign investment, other domestic 
firms producing the same product that do not receive the investment, domestic firms 
producing inputs to the production of the product, domestic firms that consume the product, 
new domestic foreign-owned firms set up by the foreign direct investment, foreign investors 
(usually multinational corporations), foreign exporters, the host government, and the 
government of the source of the foreign investment. Changing environments imply the 
modification of industrial structure of production through FDI, which influences the 
preferences and capabilities of the various firms in local trade politics. 
                                                 
29
 Benefits of local production include evading tariffs, saving on transportation costs, higher adaptability to 
changes in local markets, etc. (Ellingsen and Warneryd 1999). There are various incentives for multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) 
suggest two distinctive motivations for FDI: to access markets (horizontal FDI), and to access low wages for 
part of production process (vertical FDI). Other motivations include: presence of intangible assets specific to 
firms; exchange rate uncertainty; tax incentives; transfer pricing; quality of institutions or infrastructure such as 
the legal system; trade protection; trade effects; etc. (Caves 1996; Blonigen 2005). 
 
30
 Types of foreign participation in a domestic economy include strategic alliances and joint ventures between 
local firms and foreign competitors, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and greenfield investments by foreign 
investors.   
 17  
 
 
In the tradition of neo-classical economics, cross-border capital flows and trade are 
treated as perfect substitutes (Mundell 1957; Svensson 1984). This is called the Mundell 
equivalency: the international movement of factors of production should lead to factor price 
equalization across borders, just as international trade does.31 Since any protectionist rents 
generated for local firms by trade barriers will be dissipated if cross-border capital mobility 
increases, increasing levels of international capital mobility should reduce incentives for 
firms to lobby for trade protection (Bhagwati 1991; Blonigen and Feenstra 1996).  
There are two directions of interaction between cross-border capital mobility and 
local trade politics: how trade barriers affect international capital flows and how an 
increasing level of cross-border capital flows influences the modification of local trade 
politics. Of the two, how trade barriers trigger capital flows has been examined more fully in 
the existing literature. The so-called “tariff-jumping” FDI argument posits that multinational 
firms should have an incentive to engage in direct investment to avoid trade barriers by local 
production and gain access to a local market (Hamada 1974; Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 
1977). The incentives for investment in the protected local market are higher returns realized 
there once protective measures are implemented.   
Foreign investors engage in tariff-jumping FDI after protective measures are taken in 
a local market. However, even before trade barriers are set up in a local economy, some 
foreign producers may engage in direct investment with a view to weakening domestic 
political forces that advocate protection in the host economy. The assumption in this case is 
                                                 
31
 The factor price equalization theorem posits that the relative price of two identical factors of production 
eventually equalizes through international trade, which gives countries incentives to specialize in the production 
of goods whose factors of production are abundant in each country. A labor-abundant country specializes in the 
production of labor-intensive goods, while a capital-abundant country specializes in capital-intensive goods. 
International trade between the counties lowers the price of the scarce factor and raises the price of the abundant 
factor in each country. The assumption is that international trade is generated by differences in factor 
endowments of each country. This theory is developed from the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of international trade 
(Samuelson 1948).     
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that capital flows from the foreign investors will dampen the probability that the host country 
will later invoke protection against the foreign producers. This kind of investment is called 
quid pro quo FDI or tariff-threat-defusing FDI (Bhagwati et al. 1987, 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman 1994b; Hillman and Ursprung 1999).32 Thus foreign competitors engage in FDI in 
order to preempt trade barriers that are not yet implemented and try to appease potential 
protectionists in the local economy.33   
A parallel argument is made for exporting firms: some studies suggest that US firms 
engaging in outward direct investment have been more supportive of trade liberalization in 
the US because those firms are the beneficiaries of higher earnings from the exports of their 
foreign affiliates into the US market (Helleiner 1977; Milner 1988). For example, US 
multinational corporations that engage in FDI and intra-firm trade have been advocates for 
free trade (Bhagwati 1991). Thus, vertically integrated transnational firms have incentives to 
advocate free trade and avoid trade barriers that increase the costs of economic transactions 
between affiliates and parent firms (Hillman and Ursprung 1993).  
The literature discussed above still lacks an explicit explanation of how foreign 
capital inflows could reshuffle the structure of local trade politics. More specifically, 
relatively less attention has been paid to the discussion of foreign investment’s impacts on 
the trade policy preferences of American and foreign firms in the US. This is surprising since 
the US has received increasing amounts of foreign capital since the 1970s, and a large 
                                                 
32
 In contrast to this argument of protection-threat-defusing FDI, Blonigen and Ohno (1998) suggest that foreign 
firms, which have a relative advantage in FDI over exporting, increase exports and build protectionist pressures 
in the host country with an aim to raise trade barriers against “other” foreign competitors in future periods. They 
provide empirical evidence by investigating anti-dumping cases of tapered roller bearings, color picture tubes, 
and voluntary export restraint (VER) in Japanese automobiles. 
   
33
 This type of investment substitutes for previous exports from the foreign producers to the local market. 
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portion of the investment remains in the US.34 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that inward 
FDI should affect the US political economy. This assumption leads to two fundamental 
questions: (1) Who wins and who loses after foreign investors engage in local production in 
the US? ; and (2) How would the winners and losers modify their preferences in economic 
policies? In US trade politics, the winners and losers include American firms and US 
affiliates of foreign firms, local suppliers, and other foreign firms that export goods to the US 
market without local production.    
Undertaking case studies on five US industrial sectors that receive FDI,35 Goodman et 
al. (1996) argue that once incoming FDI has occurred, the key determinant of the corporate 
demand for protection in US trade politics is whether the investment is import 
complementing or substituting.36 In a case of import-complementing FDI, US-owned firms 
will maintain demands for protection of their outputs as they confront competition from both 
fronts: foreign imports and local production by foreign-owned domestic firms. For example, 
US affiliates of foreign firms may import outputs from their parent firms and distribute them 
in the local market. If so, other US producers have an incentive to demand protectionist 
policies aimed at those imports. As imports increase, the incentive to act against them also 
                                                 
34
 The stock of inward direct investment in the US rose from $51.5 billion in the mid-70s (2.6% of the total US 
non-financial corporate net worth) to $425.6 billion in the early 1990s (11.6% in the same measure) (Graham 
and Krugman 1995).  
 
35
 The industries examined include typewriters, color televisions, automobiles, steel and semiconductors. 
  
36
 Incoming FDI is import complementing when foreign investors in a local economy continue to rely on 
imports of the output good from their home base to serve the local market. In addition, IFDI is import 
complementing when investors use their US affiliate as a distributor or assembler or when investment actually 
results in increased demand for their products that they can only satisfy by continued imports. IFDI will 
increase imports of inputs if foreign investors choose to procure inputs from abroad. By contrast, IFDI is import 
substituting when local production by the foreign affiliate replaces production and exports from the home base 
(Goodman et al. 1996). 
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increases.37 By contrast, US affiliates of foreign parent firms will advocate free trade in 
inputs and outputs insofar as they continue to rely on imports from their home base (or other 
parts of the world) to serve the local market.38 Thus, the greater the foreign investors’ 
dependence on the international trade of inputs and outputs, the less protectionist they are 
likely to be. In a case where IFDI is import substituting, a foreign producer replaces its 
exports to the US with goods produced by its own US subsidiary. In this situation, the US 
affiliates’ interests begin to converge with other US-owned local firms’ interests.39 Then the 
US affiliates (alongside other domestic firms) may see foreign exporters as threatening their 
business and demand the protection of outputs against the exporters (Goodman et al. 1996).40 
The merit of Goodman et al. (1996) is that it examines formulations of trade policy 
preferences, differentiating US- and foreign-owned firms when inward FDI reshuffles the 
structure of local production and the goods market.41  
While Goodman et al. (1996) examines industry lobbying by conducting five industry 
case studies, Chase (1998) undertakes a large-N approach to investigate the patterns of 
                                                 
37
 The assumption is that domestic demand is fixed. 
 
38
 In a similar vein, Hillman and Ursprung (1993) argue that vertically integrated multinational corporations 
should be in favor of liberal trade policies.  
 
39
 Other local producers will continue to demand protection of outputs if they are still faced with an import 
competing situation.  
 
40
 For example, Japanese television producers in the US filed petitions with the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) for protection to restrict new competitors from Korea and Taiwan in the late 1970s after Japanese FDI 
into the US became import substituting for their previous exports to the US.  
 
41
 Another contribution of Goodman et al.’s study is that it adopts dynamic perspectives on the changing level 
of FDI that affects domestic and foreign investors’ trade policy preferences. First, the authors argue that in an 
industry where IFDI is import complementing, as the level of incoming FDI as a share of total US-based 
production increases, the industry’s aggregate demand for protection would become weaker if all other things 
are equal. This is because the foreign investors acquire relatively more representation in the sector’s aggregate 
trade policy preference than the local-based firms that prefer protection. However, if IFDI becomes more import 
substituting, then both US- and foreign-owned firms have converging interests and would demand protection 
against other foreign exporters in the US market (Goodman et al. 1996). 
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industry lobbying for protection when more inward FDI flows into the US.42 He argues that 
after foreign firms engage in IFDI, the benefits of pre-existing protectionist rents accrued to 
American producers should fall because more inflows of capital into the US will drive the 
domestic producers’ returns back to world levels (i.e., before protection).43 Moreover, as 
foreign investors join in local production, the benefits of protectionist measures become less 
excludable than before since not only domestic producers but also new entrants can enjoy the 
protectionist rents. This will cause declining marginal benefits of collective action for 
American producers, who will be less likely to contribute to protectionist lobbying than 
before.44 For these reasons, Chase (1998) suggests that protectionist demand from domestic 
producers should diminish as more foreign firms invest in the US.45 He provides empirical 
evidences by showing that industries filed fewer petitions with the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) as more inward FDI flowed into the US between 1992 and 1997. This 
study has merit in showing that domestic firms lobby less not because of their fear of 
retaliation by trade partners, but because of ineffective trade restrictions after more inward 
FDI flows into the US.46 
                                                 
42
 The number of observations in the regression model is 129, which are industries at three-digit Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) codes from 1992 to 1997 (Chase 1998). 
 
43
 The logic is from the Mundell equivalency theorem.  
 
44
 The costs of collective organization also rise since new foreign-owned firms in the US increase the group size 
of an industry. I believe this argument makes sense since Chase (1998) assumes only greenfield investments 
rather than M&A-type FDI. 
     
45
 In a similar vein, Hillman and Ursprung (1993) argue that once foreign firms enter a local market by building 
new plants (i.e., greenfield investment), domestic producers’ benefits and stake in protectionist policies should 
fall. This decreased stake in protection should decrease the local producers’ incentive to demand protection.  
 
46
 Anther important point of the study is the discussion on trade preferences of trade unions. Chase (1998) 
points out that since protection not only induces inward FDI, but also restrains outward FDI, labor continues to 
benefit from the trade restrictions, which may bring class cleavages between labor and less protectionist capital 
owners when cross-border capital mobility increases.  
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In contrast to Chase (1998), Zeng and Sherman (2005) argue that inward FDI should 
increase industry demand for trade protection. They contend that merger and acquisition 
(M&A) type FDI by foreign firms will exacerbate the sentiment that foreigners are buying 
out American firms who are getting out of business and invoke protectionist tendencies in the 
US.47 Moreover, foreign competitors’ local production ought to threaten the fortunes of local 
firms since MNCs are usually able to produce more efficiently helped by ownership-specific 
advantages and intangible assets. As foreign firms gain market share, demand for products by 
local firms should fall, all else equal. In this situation, US-owned firms’ profitability and 
even survival should be threatened, and, as a result, local producers will be more likely to 
lobby for protection (Zeng and Sherman 2005).48 Empirically, this hypothesis is supported by 
analysis of industry anti-dumping (AD) petitions filed with the ITC between 1980 and 
1995.49 This study has merit in that it shows economic globalization processes do not 
necessarily produce economic liberalization tendencies in economic actors. I believe these 
contrasting arguments (and empirical findings) by Chase (1998) and Zeng and Sherman 
(2005) reveal that foreign capital inflows’ impact on the pattern of US industry lobbying may 
be mixed, and further investigation is needed.  
Previous studies discussed above still deal with how firms in a given sector would 
respond to incoming FDI in its own sector. Thus, they do not consider how a given sector 
                                                 
47
 In contrast, Hillman and Ursprung (1993) suggest that when foreign firms acquire local firms, reduced import 
competition will decrease gains to other domestic firms from protectionist policies, and domestic firms will 
have less incentive to demand protection. The study, though, does not test its hypothesis empirically. 
     
48
 Alternatively, the authors suggest that inward FDI may dampen pressure for trade protection since MNCs can 
introduce superior knowledge in the host economy and provide more jobs and tax revenue. In the empirical test, 
though, this alternative hypothesis is not confirmed. 
   
49
 Filings of countervailing duties (CVD) complaints are not included. Industries covered are three- and four-
digit SIC levels. The statistical result shows that sectors receiving more inward FDI tend to file more petitions 
with the ITC (Zeng and Sherman 2005).   
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would modify its trade policy preference in response to FDI in other sectors in the US. Since 
various industries have business relationships with each other, it is reasonable to suspect that 
FDI in a given sector can affect the fortunes and policy preferences of other sectors. I believe 
that investigating how IFDI in a given sector affects the fortunes and lobbying patterns of 
other sectors will provide a more complete understanding of the linkage between cross-
border capital flows and industry lobbying in trade politics.         
In an attempt to fill the gap, Hiscox (2004) undertakes a general equilibrium analysis 
that employs a two-good, three-factor model developed by Jones (1971). The three factors 
are two sector-specific types of capital and one perfectly mobile type of labor across an 
economy. One type of capital, however, is mobile across national borders, while the other is 
not (Jones 1971). With this specific-factor model, Hiscox (2004) argues that if capital is 
highly sector-specific, increased international capital mobility in some sectors increases rent-
seeking incentives among owners of specific capital in other sectors. Thus, the study suggests 
that the impact of higher levels of cross-border capital mobility on the distributional effects 
of international trade should depend on the degree of inter-industry capital mobility. If a new 
tariff is imposed on a sector, the owners of capital employed in the sector gain due to the 
increased price of a good the sector produces. In this situation, foreign investors have 
incentives to engage in direct investment in the local economy to jump over tariff barriers, 
and domestic capital moves into the sector as well, seeking to realize above-normal returns in 
the protected sector. As more international and domestic capital is invested in the sector, the 
industry is supposed to hire more labor to expand production. Since labor is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile in the domestic economy, but not across borders, more labor should be 
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supplied from other domestic sectors.50 The movement of labor will drive down the returns 
of capital owners in the labor-losing industries, and they have an incentive to lobby for trade 
protection from imported goods to compensate for the reduced returns. Since the owners of 
highly specific capital are assumed to be unable to move abroad, they have no other option 
but to resort to lobbying for trade protection. Thus, as some types of capital become more 
mobile internationally, the stake in trade politics can rise for owners of other specific factors. 
Empirically, Hiscox (2004) shows that increased cross-border capital mobility (measured by 
the proportion of affiliate sales in total industry shipments)51 in other sectors raised a given 
US industry’s lobbying activities (measured by total amount of campaign contributions made 
to members of Congress and the number of petitions filed with the US International Trade 
Commission).52  
I believe that Hiscox’s study (2004) has two merits. First, it contributes to the 
development of trade theories by investigating how a given sector would modify its trade 
policy preference when cross-border capital mobility increases in other sectors. To my 
knowledge, Hiscox (2004) takes the first step in that direction. Second, developing theories 
based on Jones’ (1971) two-good three-factor formal model, Hiscox (2004) presents 
international capital mobility’s impacts on domestic trade politics in a parsimonious way, 
although at the expense of simplifying the real picture of the world.  
                                                 
50
 Thus, the possibility of immigration of the labor force is not considered in the analysis. If labor is mobile 
across borders, new labor could be supplied from overseas and not necessarily from other sectors in the 
domestic economy.  
   
51
 Since Hiscox (2004) defines cross-border capital mobility as an elasticity, the measurement of cross-border 
capital mobility includes both outward investment from US to the rest of the world and inward investment from 
overseas into the US.     
52
 The analysis of industry campaign contributions and petitions to the ITC covers two-digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code 20-38 from 1981 to 1990. Additionally, the petitions analysis is conducted at the 
three-digit SIC level from 1982 to 1996. Yet, as Hiscox (2004) points out, the three-digit level FDI data are less 
complete because figures are in many cases suppressed in particular categories and years to ensure 
confidentiality for the Bureau of Economic Analysis survey.    
 25  
 
 
However, Hiscox (2004) makes two unrealistic assumptions. First, while he theorizes 
that industrial response to cross-border capital mobility in other sectors is uniform, industrial 
response might vary in systemic ways if we consider inter-industry business relationships. 
Inward FDI in a given sector may be beneficial to some neighboring sectors but not to other 
sectors. The different impacts across sectors will be caused by goods sales connections 
between FDI-receiving sectors and their upstream or downstream sectors. As a result, 
different neighboring sectors’ responses to inward FDI in a given sector may vary as well. A 
related limitation of Hiscox (2004) is its assumption of uniformly mobile labor across 
sectors. While unskilled labor could presumably be hired anywhere there is a demand for it, 
skilled workers invest in acquiring a limited bundle of competencies. If the bundle in one 
sector is similar to the bundles of skills observed in another sector, the mobility of labor 
between sectors might be substantial. Otherwise, labor could well resist leaving a sector if its 
skills command a premium nowhere else. Thus labor should be assumed to have varying 
degrees of mobility across sectors.    
After reviewing the existing literature on FDI policies in the next section of this 
chapter, I will discuss my theories explicitly and develop hypotheses in the next chapter.  
 
2.3 FDI Politics  
 
In this section, I discuss how FDI policies have been developed in the US and explain 
why this research focuses on the demand side of trade politics rather than that of FDI.   
Historically, the US government has maintained a liberal policy toward inward and 
outward FDI since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There were noticeable exceptions, 
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though, during the First and Second World Wars and the late 1980s. For example, in 1917, 
during the First World War, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) was passed, which 
gave the president the authority to seize assets owned by foreigners.53 When Europe’s 
economy recovered between the late 1950s and the 1970s, inward FDI from European 
countries increased, and, in 1975, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) 
was established to monitor and evaluate the impact of inward FDI into the US.54 In the 
1980s, Japan rose as one of the leading foreign investors in the US, especially after the Plaza 
Accord in 1985, which devalued the US dollar by 50 percent against the Japanese yen and 
Germany’s deutsche mark over the next two years.55 When the Japanese computer and 
semiconductor company Fujitsu Limited tried to acquire California’ Fairchild Semiconductor 
Corporation,56 US legislators criticized the idea of selling out US firms to foreign 
competitors (Alvarez 1989). As a result, in 1988, the US Congress passed the Exon-Florio 
Amendment, which authorizes the President to investigate foreign acquisitions, mergers and 
takeovers of US firms from the perspective of national security (Graham and Marchick 
2006).57  
                                                 
53
 Woodrow Wilson seized virtually all US assets owned by Germans during 1917-8, and so did Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1941 (Graham and Marchick 2006). 
 
54
 CFIUS was originally established by Executive Order no. 11,858. It is chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury and includes representatives from 11 other agencies, including the departments of Defense, State, and 
Commerce, as well as Homeland Security. The Treasury Deaprtment decribes its purpose as this: “CFIUS seeks 
to serve US investment policy through thorough reviews that protect national security while maintaining the 
credibility of our open investment policy and preserving the confidence of foreign investors here and of US 
investors abroad that they will not be subject to retaliatory discrimination.” Source: 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/. 
 
55
 The devaluation of the US dollar made the asset value of US firms lower than before.  
 
56
 Ironically, when Fujitsu made its bid, Fairchild was not a US company but a subsidiary of a French company, 
Schlumberger Limited, which had bought Fairchild years before.   
 
57
 Between 1988 and 2005, there have been total of 1,593 filings, 25 investigations, and only one presidential 
rejection (the case of the China National Aero Tech’s attempt to buy MAMCO Manufacturing in 1990). Source: 
Department of Treasury (Graham and Marchick 2006).   
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Investigating the demand side of FDI politics is a demanding job, because there exist 
no “domestic institutions to channel demands and supply the policy output” (Crystal 1998). 
Conducting case studies on industry demands over the issue of inward FDI policy in several 
US manufacturing sectors, Crystal (1998) argues that domestic producers do not have 
“procedures to follow, laws to invoke, or formal government agencies” to address when 
firms want to demand a restrictive policy against inward FDI. The only exceptions are 
national security concerns embedded in the Exon-Florio Amendment, which was actually 
established not in response to demands from industry interest groups, but by political 
processes among elected policymakers who decide critical foreign economic policies (Kang 
1997). In short, US IFDI policies have been developed by political leaders’ initiatives and 
concerns about national security rather than by industrial demand.         
Given this situation, I understand that undertaking a quantitative approach to 
investigate industrial lobbying in inward FDI policies will be challenging, and for this 
reason, this research focuses on industry lobbying for trade policies. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
  
Why should we pay attention to inter-sectoral goods and labor market relationships 
when investigating the linkage between cross-border capital flows and trade politics? How 
can sale and purchase dependencies between upstream and downstream sectors, as well as 
inter-sectoral labor mobility, influence industry lobbying for protection when more cross-
border capital flows into the US? Why would inter-industry business connections and labor 
mobility affect the fortunes of a given sector when foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into 
its business partner sector(s)? To what extent would the changes in (or expectations for) the 
fortunes of an industry trigger it to make political efforts to influence trade policies? 
In this chapter, I explain my theories on how inter-sectoral goods and labor market 
relationships will affect a given sector’s demand for trade protection when its neighboring 
sectors receive inward FDI. I do not address the supply features of the “market” for policy, 
not only because the demand side is complex enough, but also because I am only 
investigating events in one country, and that country’s political institutions and party system 
are relatively stable over the time period that I investigate.  
This research adopts a sectoral approach and assumes that capital and labor are 
relatively specific to a given sector in which they are employed. Capital is, however, 
 29  
 
 
assumed to be mobile across borders within a sector.58 Because previous studies of trade 
politics have shown that a sectoral empirical model generally performs better than an 
equivalent factoral model (e.g., Magee et al. 1989; Frieden 1990; Irwin 1994, 1996; Fordham 
and McKeown 2003), it is reasonable to investigate whether a sectoral model of labor and 
capital flows would similarly perform better than the factoral approach to modeling the 
effects of these factors.  
I assume that the domestic economy is in equilibrium, and that the only relevant 
disturbance to the equilibrium is cross-border direct investment.59 I then address how inward 
FDI affects the ownership structure and production in FDI-receiving sectors, and the 
behavior of upstream and downstream sectors.   
This research considers only foreign direct investment rather than portfolio 
investment or other types of foreign participation in the US economy. Direct investment 
involves “actual control over what is owned,” while portfolio investment is “simply the 
establishment of claim on an asset for the purpose of realizing some returns” (Graham and 
Krugman 1995).60 By definition, portfolio investment does not alter the control of corporate 
assets. Because it usually takes place in a secondary securities market where most 
transactions are not initial public offerings, I assume that these transactions do not change the 
quantity or quality of the goods sold or purchased by the relevant firms. Nor does this 
                                                 
58
 A variety of sources determine the degree of capital mobility across borders. They include: interest rates; 
labor costs; strength of the home economy; market size of the host economy; government regulations and 
policies; distance and culture; firm-specific advantage factors, etc. (Huang 1997). 
     
59
 Since this research deals with the effects of inward FDI, outward investment from US multinationals to 
foreign host countries is assumed to be in equilibrium as well. 
   
60
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines FDI as “Investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest 
in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor’s purpose being to have an 
effective voice in the management of the enterprise” (Julius 1991). The US Department of Commerce defines a 
foreign investment as direct when a single investor has acquired a stake of 10 percent or more in a US firm 
(Graham and Krugman 1995).     
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research investigate strategic alliances or licensing agreements between foreign competitors 
and domestic firms, because these types of inter-firm cooperation do not involve flows of 
capital across borders.61 In short, this research deals with only two types of foreign direct 
investment: greenfield investments and merger and acquisitions (M&A) investments.      
      
3.1 Inter-sectoral Goods Market Relationships 
 
This research examines inter-sectoral goods market relationships as a source of 
changes in a given sector’s political activity in trade politics. I expect that a given sector’s 
reaction to events in upstream or downstream sectors is an increasing function of its input or 
output dependency on the sector in question. I treat dependency as the proportion of a given 
sector’s total purchases (sales) that involve transactions with the upstream (downstream) 
sector.    
This research considers only the relative importance of business relationships 
between upstream and downstream sectors. The absolute size of sales from a sector to 
another is relevant only to assessing the amount of resources that the sector devotes to 
influencing political activity. If the stakes are small, then little will be invested in securing 
them. Below I explain how a given sector’s sale and purchase dependencies affect the 
magnitude of industry lobbying for trade protection when its neighboring sectors receive 
FDI. Figure 3.1 depicts inter-sectoral goods sales relationships, inward foreign direct 
investment, and their impacts on industry lobbying.  
                                                 
61
 This research sheds light on internationally mobile capital as one of the sources of modifications in US trade 
politics. However, it may be reasonable to suspect that strategic alliances or licensing agreements between 
foreign and domestic firms could affect trade politics as well. I leave these issues for future research.          
 31  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Inter-sectoral Business Relationships, IFDI and Industry Lobbying 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
                                                                                                  Lobbying  
                                                                                         
  
   
 
   
   Goods sales   Demand shock     
 
 
 
IFDI 
 
 
 
  Goods sales   Supply shock   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                  Lobbying 
                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upstream sectors 
Receiving sectors 
Downstream sectors
 32  
 
 
3.1.1 Upstream Sectors’ Sales Dependency on Downstream Sectors 
 
If a given sector has a relatively close business connection with a particular 
downstream sector, how could foreign direct investment into the downstream sector affect 
the fortunes of the upstream sector and cause it to modify its lobbying activities? 
Consider the goods sales connections of a sector selling producers’ goods. The sector sells its 
output to various downstream industries, which use them to produce final goods. I assume 
that the domestic economy has been in equilibrium with inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) prohibited, but now the government allows inward FDI and foreign firms engage in 
local production.  
When FDI takes place in a sector, it is either greenfield investment or merger and 
acquisitions (M&A). How will the two types of FDI affect a sector that receives them? There 
are two kinds of impacts: changes in ownership structure and in industry production. If 
foreign direct investment does not change the effective control of domestic firms, then, for 
purposes of this study, it cannot be distinguished from portfolio investment. Both greenfield 
investment and M&A modify the receiving industry’s ownership structure. When greenfield 
investment occurs, foreign investors build new production facilities and the receiving sector’s 
total domestic production will increase, all else equal. By contrast, if foreign investors buy 
control of existing local firms, there is no change in the sector’s total production, all else 
equal. Thus, while both greenfield and M&A types of foreign investment have an effect on 
the corporate ownership structure of an industry, a positive industry size effect occurs only 
when greenfield investment takes place.   
How will changes in ownership structure and in industry production induced by 
inward FDI in downstream sectors influence industry lobbying in upstream sectors? I argue 
 33  
 
 
that ownership and production changes in FDI-receiving sectors will transmit a demand 
shock to upstream sectors, which in turn will affect the upstream sectors’ political activities. 
On the one hand, the modification of corporate ownership structure after M&A will induce 
foreign-controlled firms to shift purchases of intermediate goods away from domestic and 
towards foreign suppliers. This will bring a negative demand shock to upstream sectors. On 
the other hand, an increase in industry production after greenfield investment might bring a 
positive demand shock to upstream sectors. In my model both greenfield and M&A types of 
FDI could provoke a negative demand shock, but only greenfield investment could trigger a 
positive demand shock. In any case, I expect that in my empirical analysis to find that the 
effect of M&A cross-border investment might dominate the overall effect of incoming 
foreign direct investment for the period I examine. During the 1980s, the major type of 
inward FDI in the US was M&A rather than greenfield investment; the dollar value of 
acquisitions was several times that of new establishments of production facilities (Graham 
and Krugman 1995).  
Why do foreign and US firms in the same market procure intermediate input goods 
differently? How are their different sourcing patterns related to corporate ownership 
structure? How will downstream firms’ input sourcing influence the fortunes of upstream 
sectors and their lobbying activities?  
I argue that IFDI into downstream sectors will give a negative demand shock to 
domestic upstream sectors when foreign firms gain market share in downstream sectors at the 
expense of domestic firms, or – in case of M&A – merely import more intermediate input 
goods than US firms do. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports that US affiliates 
of foreign firms rely on imported inputs to a much greater degree than do domestically 
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owned firms. In 1989, the import share of intermediate inputs by US manufacturing affiliates 
was 17 percent, while that of US owned manufacturing firms was 11 percent (Zeile 1998).62 
Thus, US affiliates of foreign firms tend to import substantially more inputs than US owned 
firms in the same sector do. 
The significant difference in import propensity between foreign and domestically 
owned firms in the US arises because foreign investors usually undertake intra-firm trade 
when they engage in FDI, particularly at the early stage of the investment, to procure input 
goods unavailable from local suppliers (Goodman et al. 1996; Crystal 1998). The portion of 
intra-firm trade in total US imports has been substantial. In 1982, intra-firm trade accounted 
for 32 percent of total US imports of goods and services, increasing to 37 percent in 1993 
(Whichard and Lowe 1995).63 Moreover, during the 1980s, two-thirds of total imports by US 
manufacturing affiliates came from their foreign parent firms or other foreign affiliates of the 
parent firms (Zeile 1997). Thus US affiliates have had higher import propensities, and the 
majority of their imports has been supplied through intra-firm trade.      
Another source of US affiliates’ greater tendency to import input goods is long-term 
supply contracts between foreign firms and their home country suppliers. Caves (1996) 
suggests that if transaction costs for switching suppliers are substantial, firms usually will 
sign long-term contracts with their suppliers. In such a situation, foreign firms controlling 
production in the US would likely maintain their reliance on previously contracted suppliers, 
often located in their home country or in third countries, for supplying their US affiliates.       
                                                 
62
 In 1994, the portion of imported inputs increased to 19 percent for US affiliates, while that of US owned 
firms remained 11 percent (Zeile 1998). 
    
63
 This measurement includes imports from foreign affiliates to US parent firms and those from foreign parent 
firms to US affiliates. 
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When foreign firms produce in the US, their home country suppliers follow them by 
making their own direct investments in the US market. There are two incentives for foreign 
investors to do so. When foreign firms produce locally, either building new production 
facilities or buying out US firms, the foreign investors may require specifically designed 
parts and input goods US suppliers cannot provide. For instance, Japanese manufacturing 
firms induced their own suppliers to follow them overseas, because the Japanese suppliers 
already met their customers’ technological requirements for intermediate goods (Wassmann 
and Yamamura 1989). Thus, the dependence of the original investing firm on inputs that are 
differentiated products, along with requirements for close communication and easy goods 
movement between supplier and purchaser and substantial investment on both sides in a 
long-term relationship, create incentives for suppliers to locate close to their customers, even 
if there is not a strong formal contractual relationship between them and their customers. 
Another incentive to spur home country suppliers to follow their customer firms abroad is 
domestic content regulations that require a firm to use a certain amount of domestically 
produced inputs in producing its final outputs. For example, in the 1980s, when Japanese 
automobile companies began US production, Japanese parts suppliers accompanied them for 
this reason (Graham and Krugman 1996).64 When US affiliates procure inputs from their 
                                                 
64
 Domestic content requirements have usually been imposed by developing countries to encourage 
industrialization. Yet Japanese automobile companies’ practice of using Japanese parts when they produce cars 
overseas brought the issue to Europe and the US. For example, France declared that the Nissan Bluebird, a 
Japanese car made in Britain, would be included under France’s voluntary export restraint (VER) with Japan 
because the car assembled in Britain was actually a Japanese car using inputs from Japan and not from Britain 
(Krugman and Obstfeld 1994).  
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home country suppliers who are also producing in the US, domestic suppliers cannot sell 
input goods to the foreign owned downstream firms.65 
In sum, when foreign firms engage in FDI in downstream sectors, new foreign 
ownership can influence the fortunes of upstream sectors when US affiliates tend to procure 
inputs from their own supply sources rather than local suppliers in upstream sectors. On the 
one hand, when foreign firms buy control of domestic firms, and switch their input source 
from domestic upstream sectors to imports, domestic suppliers lose previous customers, all 
else equal. For example, if DaimlerChrysler begins to procure spark plugs from German 
suppliers rather than US suppliers that previously sold the plugs to Chrysler before the 
merger, the US suppliers lose customers, all else equal. In this case, the upstream sectors will 
have a stake in blocking imports through protectionist lobbying. On the other hand, when 
foreign firms engage in greenfield investment, US suppliers will also have a stake in 
blocking imports. First, if foreign firms in downstream sectors begin to gain market share and 
tend to procure inputs from their own sources rather than US upstream firms, US upstream 
firms’ sales will fall and their stake in blocking imports will increase, all else equal. Under 
assumptions of highly competitive markets and no rigidities, any situation where demand 
growth does not keep pace with supply growth will involve falling prices for producers. 
Second, even if foreign firms in downstream sectors do not gain market share, if trade 
barriers are provided against input goods foreign firms import, their production costs for final 
                                                 
65
 The arrival of foreign input providers might also involve increased competition for the domestic firms 
supplying inputs in markets other than the sector receiving the original FDI. For example, if a Japanese 
manufacturer of spark plugs builds facilities in the US to make spark plugs for Toyota, it may sell spark plugs to 
other sectors (e.g., aircraft, generators, other sectors that use internal combustion engines). 
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goods will increase, and domestic demand for the foreign firms’ final goods will decrease.66 
All other things being equal, decreased demand for foreign firms’ goods will trigger 
increased demand for domestically owned firms’ final goods. Then, domestic upstream firms 
that supply input goods to the domestic downstream firms will benefit.67 In this case, 
domestic upstream sectors have a stake in blocking imports and may resort to lobbying for 
protection. For example, when Japanese and European firms invested directly in the US 
automobile industry in the 1980s and 1990s, US suppliers took a protectionist stance against 
the goods purchased by the auto producers because new foreign automobile makers procured 
their input goods from their own suppliers or parent firms rather than buying from US 
suppliers (Goodman et al. 1996).  
If an upstream sector has a relatively low level of sales dependency upon an FDI-
receiving sector, the upstream sector will devote relatively a smaller effort to lobbying, 
because its fortunes will not be heavily influenced by FDI in the downstream sector, all else 
equal. In contrast, if an upstream sector is highly dependent upon its FDI-receiving 
downstream sector, the upstream sector will devote more to lobbying efforts, all else equal. I 
argue that even a competitive upstream sector will do so, because once it is highly dependent 
upon local customers (i.e., downstream firms) for its goods sales, its stake in blocking 
imports will increase if FDI-receiving downstream firms gain market share (at the expense of 
domestic producers who are purchasing their inputs from other domestic producers) and tend 
to source inputs away from the upstream sector. This will intensify the upstream sector’s 
                                                 
66
 This will be favored by a coalition of domestic producers in the receiving sector and domestic upstream 
suppliers. 
67
 I thank Thomas Oatley for pointing this out.  
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lobbying activities because the investment in the downstream sector will have a negative 
demand shock to the upstream sector.     
When FDI flows into a downstream sector, changing industry ownership structure 
will have a significant impact on industry procurement patterns in which market mechanisms 
are complicated by the presence of asset specificity. The industry procurement patterns will 
influence upstream sectors’ fortunes, which in turn should affect the sectors’ stake in 
blocking imports.  
My theory of upstream sectors’ sales dependency and changing ownership structure 
in FDI-receiving downstream sectors yields this hypothesis: 
 
H1: The more an upstream sector depends upon sales to a sector receiving foreign direct 
investment, the more effort it will devote to lobbying for protection from imports, all else 
equal. 
 
  
I have discussed how inward FDI in receiving sectors might generate a negative 
demand shock to upstream sectors and thereby influence the upstream sectors’ lobbying in 
trade politics.  
Incoming greenfield investment could generate a positive demand shock to upstream 
sectors if incoming foreign firms do not rely on intra-firm trade or long-term supplier 
relationships to provide their inputs. When production expands, the receiving sector will 
demand more input goods than before. One source is local upstream sectors. More 
downstream purchases of their intermediate goods benefit the upstream sectors. On the other 
hand, since the US is a relatively open economy, foreign producers could supply the 
additional intermediate input goods. In this case, foreign suppliers can gain, but domestic 
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upstream sectors may not. They might even lose once import penetration level rises, all else 
equal.68  
How can we expect upstream sectors to react to the expansion of a downstream sector 
after it has received FDI? A partial equilibrium model of a competitive market, with no 
rigidities allows us to predict that various upstream sectors’ responses will depend on the 
upstream producers’ level of international competitiveness.69 If an upstream sector is import-
competing, then once the receiving sector increases demand for input goods, the upstream 
sector’s stake in blocking imports will also increase, and the upstream sector will lobby for 
more protection, all else equal. The assumption is that a sector will devote more resources to 
obtaining a given political outcome if the value of the outcome increases. Hence, a 
prohibition on the import of a downstream sector’s input goods would be worth more for the 
upstream sector, all else equal. Figure 3.2 shows that an outward-shifting demand curve for 
input goods, which occurs after the downstream sector receives greenfield FDI and thereby 
expands production, can increase upstream sectors’ stakes in blocking imports. 
                                                 
68
 This is a negative demand shock case discussed above.  
69
 Industry competitiveness is represented by the net difference between the ratio of imports over shipments and 
the ratio of exports over shipments of a given sector. An industry’s ability to compete internationally is defined 
as the industry’s comparative advantage (Lavergne 1983). In fact, a given sector can produce globally 
competitive goods and non-competitive goods at the same time. However, on the whole, if a sector produces 
more competitive goods than non-competitive goods, its export ratio given its shipments size will be relatively 
higher than in the opposite case. In general, if a given sector is export-oriented, it is able to export more of the 
goods it produces and fewer goods are imported, given the sector’s size. On the contrary, if a given sector is 
import competing, it exports fewer goods, if any, and more goods are imported given its size.  
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Figure 3.2: Outward Shift of Demand Curve After Inward FDI in Downstream Sector 
(1) Closed economy 
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(3) Open economy – Change in downstream demand after FDI into the downstream sector 
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(4) Open economy – imports, FDI into downstream sector and additional tariffs 
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When an upstream sector is import-competing, if the upstream sector is highly 
dependent upon the downstream sector for its sales, then the upstream sector’s stake in 
blocking imports increases accordingly. As a result, the highly dependent upstream sector 
will devote more effort to obtaining trade protection, all else equal. On the other hand, if the 
upstream sector is relatively less dependent upon the downstream sector, then the upstream 
sector’s stake in blocking imports is relatively low. In this case, the less dependent upstream 
sector will spend fewer resources for its protectionist demand. 
Meanwhile, when an upstream industry is internationally competitive and producers 
in that industry worldwide cannot easily differentiate their products from the production of 
other producers in the sector, then the value of a prohibition of foreign imports will be small 
or nonexistent, because the level of import penetration will be relatively small and the 
incoming foreign owners by assumption would have no particular interest in relying on intra-
firm trade or long-term supply contracts. In this situation, the competitive upstream sector 
has no incentive to demand protection, all else equal. Moreover, because the upstream sector 
produces competitive intermediate goods, the FDI-receiving downstream sector will be more 
likely to procure the input goods from the domestic upstream sector rather than less 
competitive imports, and the downstream sector has no motive to expend effort to change 
trade barriers. In short, once inward FDI in the downstream sector benefits the competitive 
upstream sector, the upstream sector has no incentive to engage in lobbying efforts for trade 
protection, all else equal.70 
                                                 
70
 Alternatively, the competitive upstream sector would not demand protection because of the fear of retaliation 
from foreign competitors (Helleiner 1977; Fong 1983; Milner 1988). Should the industry demand protection, 
foreign competitors will induce governments in their home markets to impose retaliatory protection against the 
upstream sector’s goods. 
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My theories on industrial competitiveness and the sales dependency of a given 
upstream sector upon its downstream sector yield another hypothesis: 
 
H2: When an upstream sector is not competitive, the more the sector depends upon sales to a 
sector receiving foreign direct investment, the more effort it will devote to lobbying for 
protection from imports, all else equal.71 
 
Upstream sectors’ dependency upon downstream sectors matters because a demand 
shock induced by inward FDI in a downstream sector gives upstream sectors incentives to 
lobby in trade politics. An increase in industry production or changes in ownership structure 
after FDI in a downstream sector is a source of demand shock to an upstream sector. When 
there is a positive demand shock and no product differentiation, intra-firm trade, or long-term 
supplier relationships, import-competing upstream sectors lobby for increased rents that will 
be provided by trade barriers. Export-oriented sectors do not lobby because the positive 
demand shock benefits them. When higher import propensity of foreign firms in downstream 
sectors causes a negative demand shock, upstream sectors tend to lobby more to compensate 
loss, all else equal.72  
Both Hypotheses 1 and 2 imply that upstream sectors’ sales dependency upon 
downstream sectors influences the magnitude of industrial lobbying in the era of increased 
cross-border direct investment. However, while Hypothesis 2 focuses on an upstream 
                                                 
71
 Since a given upstream sector’s competitiveness is a continuous concept from negative to positive, as the 
sector’s competitiveness increases, the magnitude of extra protection demands will decrease accordingly.  
     
72
 However, alternatively, even after foreign firms engage in direct investment in downstream sectors, the 
investment may not trigger a demand shock in upstream sectors if domestic firms reduce production 
accordingly. In this case, newly foreign-owned firms in downstream sectors simply gain market share 
previously owned by domestic firms, and domestic upstream sectors switch their customers from US firms to 
foreign firms producing in the US. An assumption is that input goods are perfect substitutes. I thank Thomas 
Oatley for pointing out this case. 
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sector’s competitiveness, Hypothesis 1 suggests that, independently of its level of 
comparative advantage, an upstream sector’s level of sales dependency should itself affect 
industry lobbying. This is because even export-oriented upstream sectors will want to limit 
foreign inputs flowing into the US when the receiving sector is characterized by the supply 
rigidities that have been already mentioned. In such a situation, the domestic suppliers’ 
comparative advantage is irrelevant to the purchasing decisions of the foreign firm (at least, 
until the difference in price or quality of goods between the domestic and the foreign input 
suppliers become relatively large). Comparing empirical tests on Hypotheses 1 and 2 will 
have important implications in the discussion of industry lobbying in trade politics in the era 
of economic globalization. If sales dependency has independent and substantial impacts on 
industry lobbying, then we should highlight the structure of inter-industry business 
connections in addition to industrial competitiveness when we take sectoral approaches in 
trade politics.  
 
3.1.2 Downstream Sectors’ Purchase Dependency on Upstream Sectors 
 
How would inward FDI affect lobbying activities in downstream sectors? Should 
inter-sectoral goods market relationships have any effect on the political efforts of 
downstream sectors? If so, how would the effects of purchase dependency be different from 
those of sales dependency? 
Consider a given downstream sector observing foreign direct investment in the 
receiving sector. When foreign investors engage in greenfield investments in the US, there 
will be an increase in industry output, all else equal (It might be assumed that some or all of 
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that increase is exported. However, as an empirical matter this assumption is unrealistic, 
because foreign investors usually undertake market-oriented FDI to sell output in the US, 
which is the largest market in the world).73 As in the upstream case, when foreign firms 
merely take control of local firms, I assume that there is no substantial change in industry 
production, all else equal.  
How would a FDI-receiving sector’s production increase influence the intermediate 
goods market? As Figure 3.3 shows, when industry production expands, the domestic supply 
curve of intermediate goods the upstream sector produces will shift outward, all else equal. 
The outward shift of the supply curve will reduce the price of the good and increase the 
quantity of the good available, if all else remains constant. When the price of intermediate 
goods produced by the FDI-receiving upstream sector declines, its downstream sector will 
gain.  
                                                 
73
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Purchase Power Parity (PPP) level is highest in the North America Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA), surpassing the European Union (EU). Source: CIA World Fact Book 2005. 
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Figure 3.3: Outward Shift of the Supply Curve of Receiving Sector 
1) Closed economy 
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(3) Open economy – imports and tariffs 
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Any industry that purchases intermediate goods from an FDI-receiving upstream 
sector would benefit as long as the price of the goods decreases after the supply expands. 
Here, the level of purchase dependency of a given upstream sector upon the downstream 
industry determines the relative size of the gains. A sector that buys a lot of the intermediate 
goods (considering its sales) will benefit more, while another sector that purchases relatively 
smaller amounts of the goods (considering its sales) will benefit less. Thus, if a downstream 
sector is highly dependent upon a receiving sector, the expansion of the goods market after 
greenfield investment in the upstream sector will provide more benefit to the downstream 
sector, all else equal. By contrast, if a downstream sector is less dependent upon its upstream 
sector, it will have smaller gains from the lowered input costs induced by inward FDI in the 
upstream sector. 
In this research I assume that a given downstream sector’s reduced input costs will 
reduce its vulnerability to international competition, all else equal. In this situation, the 
downstream sector will reduce its magnitude of lobbying for trade protection because the 
gains from import restrictions on its final goods would be smaller: the price difference 
between the domestic price and the world price will have decreased or even disappeared, and 
the quantity sold by foreign competitors in the domestic market will also have decreased. In 
terms of the above diagrams, this is represented by PT - PFDI. 
How would a downstream sector’s purchase dependency affect the magnitude of its 
political efforts? If a downstream sector gains heavily because it is highly dependent upon its 
upstream sector for input goods, the magnitude of reduction in its lobbying efforts will be 
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accordingly substantial, all else equal.74 In contrast, if a downstream sector has a relatively 
low purchase dependency upon its upstream sector, the gains from lowering input costs will 
be small, if any, and the magnitude of reduction in its lobbying efforts will also be small, all 
else equal. Thus, how highly a given downstream sector is dependent upon its upstream 
sector (i.e., the level of purchase dependency) will affect its lobbying efforts when the 
upstream sector receives FDI and expands production.   
This research argues that a downstream sector will not change its trade policy 
preference when there is no substantial change in industry production when M&A- type 
foreign investment takes place, all else equal. If production increases after greenfield 
investment in upstream sectors, a downstream sector will benefit from reduced procurement 
costs and may devote less effort to protectionist lobbying, all else equal. Because neither 
process reduces the welfare of the downstream sector, I hypothesize that there should be 
either no increase or a net decrease of lobbying efforts from the downstream sector when its 
upstream sector receives FDI.      
 
H3: The more a downstream sector depends upon purchases to a sector receiving foreign 
direct investment, the less effort it will devote to lobbying for protection from imports, all 
else equal.  
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Hiscox (2004) has investigated a sector’s lobbying 
patterns when other sectors have a higher level of cross-border capital mobility. He argues 
that a given sector’s increased capital mobility has a positive effect on another sector’s 
                                                 
74
 If we assume a minimal fixed cost for lobbying, the gains from lowering procurement cost and the magnitude 
of decreasing lobbying efforts will be a step function rather than a linear function. However, this research 
assumes that if a given sector is spending a substantial amount of resources for lobbying, there should be a “net” 
decrease of lobbying efforts, all else equal. I thank Mark Crescenzi for pointing out this issue. 
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lobbying, since the latter is losing labor to the FDI-receiving sector.75 My focus and 
assumptions differ from his. I distinguish between upstream and downstream sectors rather 
than following his method of aggregating all sectors. When an upstream sector is heavily 
dependent upon its downstream sector, increased inward FDI in the downstream sector will 
usually have a positive impact on the upstream sector’s lobbying for trade protection, all else 
equal (Hypothesis 1). However, incoming FDI in an upstream sector will have a negative 
effect on its downstream sector’s lobbying efforts, if the increased local supply of goods 
benefits the downstream sector, ceteris paribus, or no effect if the incoming investment is 
M&A related (Hypothesis 3). A more differentiated approach ought to be more accurate if 
sales or purchase dependency mediates the effects of foreign investment in other domestic 
sectors. Treating other sectors as if they are all of equal importance is a comparatively 
restrictive assumption.  
Hiscox (2004) posits that labor market effects are the primary driver of changes in a 
sector’s political effort. Like Hiscox (2004), I also treat labor market effects, but my 
approach there also differs from his.  
 
3.2 Inter-sectoral Labor Mobility 
 
Goods market effects are not the only determinant of inter-sectoral relationships. The 
results obtained by Hiscox (2004) suggest that labor mobility across sectors also could affect 
the relationships.    
                                                 
75
 While Hiscox (2004) deals with international capital mobility including outward and inward FDI, my 
research deals with inward FDI only. Thus the two studies are not directly comparable.   
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In the sectoral (or Ricardo-Viner) model of trade politics, capital is usually 
considered as a specific factor that is immobile across industries. By contrast, another factor 
of production, labor, is assumed in the literature to be homogenous and mobile across sectors 
(but not across borders).76  Hiscox (2004) investigated the impact of cross-border capital 
mobility on trade politics, by using Jones’ (1971) specific factor model, which employs two 
types of specific capital (internationally mobile or not) and one type of labor, which is mobile 
and shared across sectors in an economy. Both Jones (1971) and Hiscox (2004) treat labor as 
a uniformly mobile factor in the interest of working with a formally tractable model. If that 
objective gives way to an emphasis on empirical accuracy, then an approach that treats labor 
flows into and pout of sectors as potentially constrained might be preferable. In the Jones 
(1971) model, the assumption of mobile labor is crucial because the mobility determines a 
given sector’s fortunes when other sectors have higher levels of inward cross-border capital 
and attract labor. I investigate whether the mobility of labor in a given sector will differ 
substantially from that of another sector, both in terms of where labor goes and how easily it 
does.77 While labor in some sectors can move to other sectors with relative ease, labor in 
other sectors may be relatively specific to the sector in which it is employed.  
I assume that different levels of labor mobility in various sectors arise from inter-
sectoral variation in the level of specificity of labor skills. If an industry hires highly sector-
specific skilled labor, then labor will be less mobile to other sectors because the specific 
labor skills would not be useful to other sectors that employ labor with different kinds of 
skills. Likewise, the sector will be less able to recruit new labor from other sectors. Then the 
                                                 
76
 Another factor of production is land. Since this research deals with manufacturing industries only, land is not 
included in this analysis. 
   
77
 Likewise, its source of labor might well differ from the sources of another industry. And the industries that 
absorb its labor might also be different from those of another sector. 
 52  
 
 
sector with highly sector-specific skilled labor will be more likely to have a relatively low 
level of labor mobility, all else constant. In contrast, if an industry hires relatively less sector-
specific skilled labor, then the labor will be more mobile to other sectors that also employ 
less sector-specific skilled labor. The assumption is that non-sector-specific skilled labor is 
relatively easily compatible with other sectors. By the same token, the sector will be able to 
recruit new labor from other sectors relatively easily, since required labor skills are not 
highly sector-specific. Then the sector will be more likely to have a high level of labor 
mobility, all else equal.78     
Why should a given sector’s level of labor mobility matter when other sectors receive 
greenfield-type FDI and draw labor from the given sector? If a given sector has a relatively 
high level of labor mobility, the industry is assumed to employ less sector-specific skilled 
labor.79 In this case, the capital owners employing the less sector-specific skilled labor may 
be more likely to lose labor to given FDI-receiving sectors that expand production and attract 
labor, all else equal. Should labor move to the FDI-receiving sectors, the capital owners in 
the labor-losing sector will be subject to decreased returns. Then the owners of the capital 
will have an incentive to lobby for trade protection to compensate for the loss. In contrast, if 
a sector employs highly sector-specific skilled labor, which is not compatible with other 
sectors, the owners of capital in the sector may not worry about losing labor to other sectors 
                                                 
78
 For example, assume that the apparel industry receives cross-border investments, expands local production 
and attracts labor. It can be expected that labor employed in the textile industry could be relatively mobile to the 
apparel industry if the type and levels of labor skills required in both industries are similar. Capital owners of 
the textile industry might then lose labor to the apparel industry relatively easily, all else equal. In contrast, the 
electrical machinery industry, which employs relatively sector-specific skilled labor, would be less likely to lose 
labor to the apparel industry, all else constant. The logic behind this prediction is that labor skills in the 
electrical machinery industry are relatively highly specific to the sector and are not compatible with the apparel 
industry. 
 
79
 Less sector-specific skilled labor does not necessarily mean less skilled labor. This research does not 
distinguish between less or highly skilled labor but considers the “specificity” of labor skills used in a sector.    
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that receive greenfield-type FDI and attract labor. This is because sector-specific skilled 
labor is not easily suited to other sectors even though FDI-receiving sectors generally draw 
labor from other parts of the economy. Then the capital owners may make less effort to 
expend extra resources for lobbying activities, all else equal.  
My theory of sector-specific labor skills yields another hypothesis that posits a causal 
relationship between inter-sectoral labor mobility and industry lobbying in trade politics 
when greenfield investment flows into other sectors:  
     
H4: The higher a sector’s labor mobility, the more effort it will devote to lobbying for 
protection from imports when more greenfield direct investment flows into another sector, all 
else equal. 
 
Since Hypothesis 4 assumes there should be a net increase in industry production 
after foreign firms engage in local production, it only deals with greenfield-type FDI rather 
than M&A-type FDI. Thus, the impact might be relatively minor when the major type of FDI 
is M&A rather than greenfield investment.   
Discussion of model specifications, measurement of variables, and data sources will 
follow in the next chapter.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANAYSIS 
 
In order to test my hypotheses, I undertake a quantitative approach for several 
reasons.80 First of all, all required data have been published to analyze cross-border capital 
flows and trade politics in US manufacturing sectors during the 1980s. In addition, a total of 
ninety observations (i.e., eighteen manufacturing industries in five Congressional election 
periods) can be tested more efficiently and parsimoniously with a quantitative method than 
with a qualitative one. Since the major goal of this research is to show how inter-sectoral 
goods and labor market relationships mattered in US trade politics in the 1980s, investigating 
a larger number of industry cases with a quantitative approach will provide more conclusive 
results than a qualitative approach that selects a couple of representative industries.81 
Moreover, the more observations of inter-industry relationships that are included, the more 
variance among observations can be investigated.82     
                                                 
80
 A multivariate statistical method can simplify assumptions about causes and their interrelation as variables. 
An examination of patterns of co-variation among the variables can be used as a basis for making general 
statements about relations between aspects of cases considered collectively as populations of comparable 
observations (Ragin 1987). 
 
81
 However, I do not claim that case studies are an irrelevant approach to test my theory. Conducting industry 
case studies might test my theory as well. But my quantitative approach will be more conclusive (i.e., including 
more cases of various sectors), and interpretation of industry lobbying activities can be more standardized than 
in a case study approach. 
     
82
 This research employs two kinds of dependent variables (i.e., the amount of industry campaign contributions 
and the number of industry petitions for trade protection), and currently available statistical packages provide 
different estimations for the analysis of each variable. I use STATA 9 SE for the analyses.  
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This chapter has two sections. First, I discuss the specification of regression models. 
Then I present how I measure each variable used in the statistical analyses, including the 
sources of the variables. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide the basic statistics and expected signs of 
coefficients in each variable.         
 
4.1 Empirical Model Specification 
 
This research examines the demand side of US trade politics during the 1980s. The 
unit of analysis is an individual US manufacturing sector in a single year. The number of 
industries covered is eighteen: two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes from 
20 to 38, with the exception of 21.83 The time span is from 1981 to 1990, which spans five 
Congresses (from the 97th to the 101st). I chose the eighteen manufacturing sectors because 
they are tradable sectors and data is readily available.84  
This research focuses on the experiences of the 1980s, because, practically, data for 
one of my dependent variables, industrial campaign contributions to candidates for the US 
                                                 
83
 The industries covered include: Food and kindred products (SIC code 20), Textile mill products (22), Apparel 
(23), Lumber and wood products (24), Furniture and fixtures (25), Paper (26) Printing and publishing (27), 
Chemicals (28), Petroleum and coal (29), Rubber and plastics (30), Leather (31), Stone, clay, and glass products 
(32), Primary metals (33), Fabricated metals (34), Industrial machinery (35), Electrical machinery (36), 
Transportation equipment (37), and Instruments (38). 
    
84
 For the primary sectors (agriculture, forestry, fishing), Input-Output Benchmark data cannot be converted to 
SIC two-digit codes. For the mining industry, the Current Population Survey from which I have compiled the 
labor mobility variable does not have detailed level data (the mining industry has four sub-level categories: 
metal mining; coal mining; oil and gas extraction; and non-metallic minerals). According to the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, sales to the federal government and industry concentration ratios are not available for the 
primary sectors and the mining sector. Even though not included in this research, the size of incoming FDI in 
the mining sector is not substantial (1 or 2 percent of the total inward FDI in the US). The service sector is not 
included since it was not tradable in the 1980s. The construction sector is not tradable, either. 
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Congress, is readily available only for the 80s.85 In addition to the data availability issue, 
inward foreign direct investment into the US increased at a noticeably larger pace in the 
1980s than in previous decades. While FDI flows into the US were less than 0.5 percent of 
gross national production (GNP) in the 1970s, they reached 1 percent at the beginning of 
1980s, and 1.4 percent by the end of the decade (Graham and Krugman 1995). In 1990, US 
affiliates of (non-bank) foreign firms employed approximately 5 percent of the total US labor 
force (Lipsey 1992). Given the increased FDI flows into the US in the 1980s, it is reasonable 
to suspect that this investment had an impact on US political economy.  
To my knowledge, no research has systematically investigated the linkage between 
inter-industry economic relationships and industry lobbying in trade politics. Hence my focus 
on the structure of inter-sectoral connections in the analysis of US trade politics will still 
have theoretical implications in the IPE literature, even though data availability limits the 
scope of the research to the decade of the 1980s.   
My basic estimation method for analyzing industrial campaign contributions is the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with time period dummies employed to 
account for unspecified period effects. For example, without period dummies, if the sales of 
rubber and plastics increased in the year 1984 due to the Los Angeles Olympic Games, the 
source of increased sales of rubber and plastics will remain in the residual (i.e., error term) 
because no independent variable deals with that kind of period effect.86 The inclusion of 
period dummy variables will control for unexplained period and trend effects. Since the main 
                                                 
85
 Data for other periods is out there, but the cost of mapping it into SIC categories and coding it is very high. 
The industry level campaign contribution data was compiled by Fordham and McKeown (2003).   
86
 If the period effect is included in the error term, then the residual and explanatory variables are correlated, 
and this is a violation of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. 
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concern of this research is variations across sectors, the industry fixed effects model, which 
analyzes variation over periods within an industry, is not employed.87  
The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is chosen to analyze industry 
petitions. Negative binomial estimation for a discrete probability model is appropriate 
because the dependent variable is a count of petitions filed by each industry in each period 
(Long 1997). Since a petition filed by an industry in a given period is likely to be related to 
other petitions filed by the sector in the same period, the NBRM is more suitable than the 
Poisson model, which assumes independent events (King 1989).88  
In addition to the basic OLS and negative binomial estimations, each model will be 
estimated with one-period lagged independent variables to allow more time for independent 
variables to have an influence on dependent variables. Most campaign contributions are 
made before the members of Congress are elected and vote in the next congressional period. 
Thus, the investigation of how independent variables in the previous period affect campaign 
contributions in the current period is necessary to test my theory empirically.        
This research employs two regression models to analyze industrial campaign 
contributions and two negative binomial regression models to analyze industrial petitions 
filed with the ITC. Campaign contributions analyses include: (1) Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with period dummies and (2) OLS with lagged independent variables and period 
dummies. Petitions analyses include: (1) a negative binomial regression model (NBRM) with 
period dummies and (2) a NBRM with lagged independent variables and period dummies.     
 
                                                 
87
 I do not employ the panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) model developed by Beck and Katz (1995), 
because I deal with panel data that have a smaller number of repeated observations on a larger number of 
sample units. The PCSEs model is more suitable for the analysis of cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) data that 
usually have more time-serial dominance than cross-sectional dominance (Beck and Katz 1995). 
88
 Estimates of the over-dispersion parameter showed that this supposition is correct.  
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4.2 Variables, Measurement and Source of Data  
 
In this section, I explain how each variable has been compiled and measured. I also 
predict how each independent variable will be associated with dependent variables. The 
predictions are based on my theory on inter-industry relationships, as well as conventional 
wisdom from existing literature on trade politics.  
I test my theories with two dependent variables (i.e., industrial campaign 
contributions to protectionist candidates and petitions filed with the US International Trade 
Commission) employing five explanatory and five control variables.    
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
Lobbying activities take place to influence the political process in ways that further 
the specific interests of organized groups (Grossman and Helpman 2002).89 This research 
measures industrial lobbying activities for trade protection in two ways. One is by calculating 
the total dollar amount of campaign contributions made by each manufacturing industry to 
electoral candidates for the House of Representatives who voted for a protectionist bill in 
each of the five Congresses (from the 97th to the 101st).90 The other is by counting the 
number of petitions filed by each manufacturing sector with the US International Trade 
Commission (USITC) for antidumping and countervailing duties for the same Congressional 
periods.    
                                                 
89
 Measuring industry pressure exercised on the government is challenging since the nature of political pressure 
is secret and non-quantifiable. Furthermore, the political bargaining between societal actors and the government 
is often not issue-specific (Lavergne 1983; Hiscox 2004). 
 
90
 The 97th Congress ran from 1981 to 1982, and the 101st ran from 1989 to 1990.  
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Political Action Committees (PACs) are private interest groups organized to support 
political candidates to promote legislation that represents their special interests. The Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) reports all campaign contributions to individual candidates 
made by PACs.91 Since this research requires an industry-level measurement of demand for 
trade protection, corporate-level campaign contributions by PACs should be converted to 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Recently, Fordham and McKeown (2003) 
coded all corporate PAC campaign contributions between 1981 and 1990 into two-digit SIC 
categories. My research basically relies on their two-digit SIC level campaign contributions 
data.92  
The original data, though, includes all campaign contributions made to any candidates 
regardless of their preferences regarding US trade policy.93 Yet it is reasonable to assume 
that some candidates prefer protectionist policies while other candidates advocate free 
trade.94 In order to analyze industrial demand for trade protection, it is necessary to compile 
data of campaign contributions made only to protectionist candidates. From the original data, 
I have extracted corporate contributions data for the candidates who voted for protectionist 
                                                 
91
 The US Congress created the Federal Election Commission in 1975 to govern the financing of federal 
elections. It is an independent agency made up of six members who are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. Its duties inclcude: to disclose campaign finance information, to enforce the 
provisions of the law such as the limits and prohibitions on contributions, and to oversee the public funding of 
Presidential elections. Source: http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml  
 
92
 I am very grateful to the authors for sharing the data with me.   
 
93
 According to Hiscox (2004), “campaign contributions may not be aimed only (or even chiefly) at encouraging 
politicians to alter trade restrictions.” He argues that his model “describes relationships between international 
mobility and the income effects of any kind of policy change that alters relative prices ” and “campaign 
contributions should provide decent raw material.” 
 
94
 I thank Thomas Oatley and Layna Mosley for pointing out this issue. 
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bills.95 I then compiled the data at the two-digit SIC level. Industrial contributions only to 
protectionist candidates are more relevant for analyzing industrial demand for trade 
protection than are contributions to all candidates. Hence, this research assumes that 
contributions to the protectionist candidates are a direct measurement of each industry’s 
lobbying for protection, seeking benefits from trade-related policies.  
A critic might point out that protectionist candidates vote not only for trade-related 
bills but also for other bills on various policy issues. Industry pressure groups might have 
made financial contributions to their favored candidates seeking benefits from other policies, 
not necessarily from trade policy. Then, it might be assumed that industry lobbying to 
protectionist candidates can be interpreted as the interest groups’ pursuit of favorable policies 
in general, not necessarily on trade issues alone. Still, industry contributions to protectionist 
candidates can be a valid measurement of corporate lobbying activities in trade politics, 
because we can only infer contributors’ lobbying purpose from their recipients’ voting 
records.96    
                                                 
95
 Bills used to sort out protectionist representatives in each Congress are as follows: For the 97th Congress, 
H.R.5133, a bill to establish domestic content requirements for motor vehicles sold in the United States, and for 
other purposes; for the 98th Congress, H.R. 1234, a bill to establish domestic content requirements for motor 
vehicles sold or distributed in interstate commerce in the United States; for the 99th Congress, a bill to achieve 
the objectives of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and to promote the economic recovery of the United States 
textile and apparel industry and its workers; for the 100th congress, a vote to pass, over President Reagan’s veto, 
H.R. 3, the Omnibus Trade Bill, a bill to enhance American industrial competitiveness abroad by strengthening 
actions against unfair foreign trade, clarifying guidelines for business conduct abroad, reorganizing education 
and export programs, rescinding the windfall profits tax on oil, and requiring advance notice of large-scale plant 
closings and layoffs; for the 101st Congress, a vote to override the President’s veto of H.R. 4328, the textile, 
apparel, and footwear trade act of 1990, to provide for orderly imports of textiles, apparel, and footwear. Voting 
records for individual members of Congress are from the web page of the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Source: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/index.html. 
 
96
 Investigating voting patterns of protectionist candidates on other policy issues will be an interesting topic, but 
it is beyond the scope of this study and I leave it for future research. 
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I employ another measurement of industrial demand for trade protection – the number 
of petitions each industry filed with the US International Trade Commission (ITC).97 Under 
the Tariff Act of 1930,98 US industries may file petitions with the ITC requesting anti-
dumping or countervailing duties for relief from unfairly priced (i.e., dumped) and subsidized 
imports.99 The role of the ITC is to investigate industry petitions and determine whether 
dumping or subsidization is injuring the petitioners or threatening them with injury. Since 
this research investigates only the demand side of trade politics, it does not consider whether 
relief has been provided for each petition case.100 Previous studies have used the petitions to 
examine theories of trade politics (e.g., Goldstein 1986; Hansen 1990; Blonigen and Feenstra 
1996; Knetter and Prusa 2000), and industry petitions are said to be “the most direct measure 
of demand for trade policy available” (Gilligan 1997).  
Because industry campaign contributions are made to persuade politicians to legislate 
trade policies favorable to the industries, this research considers the contributions as the 
interest groups’ political efforts either to realize rents from protectionist policies or to 
compensate for a loss from an increasing level of imports. Thus the contributions have wider 
                                                 
97
 The ITC investigates three major areas: escape clause, anti-dumping, and countervailing duty cases. This 
research does not include cases of escape clause, since they were rarely used in the 1980s. ITC decisions on 
escape clause cases are subject to presidential veto, while ITC findings of injury in antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases are legally binding (Destler 1995).  
 
98
 Originally, Congress created the US Tariff Commission in 1916 as a fact-finding agency, which later 
acquired authority in trade regulation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the 
commission changed its name to the ITC (Hansen 1990). 
 
99
 Dumping occurs when a foreign producer sells a product in the US at a price that is below that producer's 
sales price in its home market or at a price that is lower than its cost of production. Subsidizing occurs when a 
foreign government provides financial assistance to benefit the production, manufacture, or export of a good. If 
the Department of Commerce finds that an imported product is dumped or subsidized, and if the ITC finds that 
a US industry producing a like product is materially injured or threatened with material injury, an antidumping 
duty order or countervailing duty order will be imposed to offset the dumping or subsidies. Source: 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm 
 
100
 Types of relief include an increase in tariff, quantitative restrictions on imports, or adjustment assistance and 
so forth (Hansen 1990).   
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purposes of protectionist lobbying. Meanwhile, industry petitions have more specific 
conditions and goals because petitions are filed only when industries have been injured or 
threatened by foreign competitors’ unfair trade practices. Thus, industry petitions are 
considered as the petitioners’ efforts to seek retaliation against foreign competitors. In short, 
campaign contributions capture more general industry lobbying efforts than petitions that 
have more specific goals.                 
   
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
This research employs five main explanatory variables. They are the following: cross-
border capital mobility in one’s own sector, an upstream sector’s sales dependency upon 
FDI-receiving sectors (i.e., IFDI-effective sales dependency), a downstream sector’s 
purchase dependency upon FDI-receiving sectors (i.e., IFDI-effective purchase dependency), 
and a given sector’s labor mobility with FDI-receiving sectors (i.e., IFDI-effective labor 
mobility).101 In addition, to test my conditional hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), I employ an 
interaction term between a sector’s IFDI-effective sales dependency variable and the sector’s 
net imports-exposure.    
How can we measure inward and outward foreign direct investment? 102 The Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA)103 at the Department of Commerce publishes records of the 
                                                 
101
 Since a given sector’s IFDI-effective sales dependency variable is the sum of 17 bilateral individual 
relationships between the sector and each of 17 sectors, the variable is not an interaction term between a given 
sector’s sales dependency upon the other 17 sectors and IFDI in the 17 sectors. The same is true for IFDI-
effective purchase dependency and IFDI-effective labor mobility variables.   
 
102
 Graham and Krugman (1994) suggest four methods for measuring inward FDI in the US: the stock of FDI as 
measured by cumulative investments, the assets of US affiliates of foreign firms, the number of workers 
employed by these affiliates, and the value-added component of the output of these affiliates.  
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total assets and sales values of both US affiliates of foreign firms and foreign affiliates of US 
firms at two- and three-digit SIC levels.104 The BEA collects data on FDI by means of 
mandatory surveys of the US affiliates of foreign firms and foreign affiliates of US firms.105 
The sales and assets of US affiliates of foreign firms indicate inward foreign direct 
investment, and those of foreign affiliates of US firms represent outward foreign direct 
investment.  
The assets and sales data of US affiliates are indicators of the financial structure and 
operations of those firms. I employ these assets and sales data because each represents the 
extent to which foreign investors are involved in US economy through direct ownership and 
local production, respectively, in a particular period. An alternative way to measure inward 
FDI is to capture the transferred funds from foreign parent firms to their US affiliates for a 
particular period. The BEA collects capital flows data to calculate the US balance of 
payments (BOP). However, the capital flows data do not have implications for the relative 
portion of foreign participation in the US economy.  
Asset measurement of inward FDI indicates the portion of assets owned by foreign 
firms in the total assets of an industry.106 Hence FDI at the asset level measures the changing 
                                                                                                                                                       
103
 The BEA is a federal agency that collects and reports data on US national income and product accounts, 
balance of payments accounts, and other economic data.   
 
104
 The Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the US, and 
Direct Investment Abroad (http://www.bea.gov/bea/di1.htm). FDI data used in this research is from Michael 
Hiscox at Harvard University. I am very grateful to him for sharing the data with me. An alternative source of 
FDI data is Foreign Direct Investment in the US, published by the International Trade Administration (ITA), 
which was used in Zeng and Sherman (2005). This research, though, does not employ the ITA data since it 
provides only a count of FDI inflows in each industry.   
 
105
 Assets are measured at gross book value of property, plant, equipment, etc. See “A guide to BEA statistics 
on foreign direct investment in the US” by Alicia M. Quijano in Survey of Current Business, February 1990. 
 
106
 Since a foreign investor can borrow funds locally rather than from its foreign parent firm or from other 
sources of funds, this measurement does not necessarily mean actual money flowing from overseas into the US. 
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ownership structure of an industry between domestic and foreign firms. The sales 
measurement of inward FDI indicates the portion of sales by foreign firms producing in the 
US in total industry sales. Hence, inward FDI at sales level implies changes in the structure 
of goods production between US- and foreign-owned firms.    
The first explanatory variable is the level of cross-border capital mobility in one’s 
own sector. This research employs this variable to examine the arguments of existing 
literature that increasing levels of international capital mobility should reduce incentives 
among firms to lobby for protection (Milner 1988; Bhagwati 1991; Chase 1998). The own 
sector capital mobility variable includes inward and outward FDI.107 This variable is 
constructed by a given sector’s total sales or assets of all affiliates (US affiliates of foreign 
firms and foreign affiliates of US firms) divided by the sector’s total sales or assets, 
respectively.108 If own sector capital mobility turns out to be negatively associated with 
industry lobbying, then the theories of the existing literature can be confirmed.      
To investigate how inter-sectoral goods market relationships affect industrial 
lobbying efforts, this research employs two explanatory variables: an upstream sector’s IFDI-
effective sales dependency and a downstream sector’s IFDI-effective purchase dependency. 
A given sector’s sales dependency upon its downstream sector is the portion of shipments 
                                                                                                                                                       
I thank Timothy McKeown for pointing this out. Survey of Current Business by the BEA shows that US 
residents hold a significant portion of the assets in US affiliates of foreign firms.      
107
 In the campaign contribution analysis by Hiscox (2004), the sign of the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant when the capital mobility variable for other sectors is not included in the regression 
model. Yet the sign turns out to be positive and statistically insignificant when capital mobility in other sectors 
is included. Furthermore, in his ITC petition analysis, the sign of the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. 
 
108
 This measurement of cross-border capital mobility is not perfect, as Hiscox (2004) points out. Measuring 
capital mobility in this way does not allow for variation in the incentives to move for international capital. Yet 
this research does not investigate the various incentives of cross-border capital mobility.      
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from the sector to its downstream sector in the given sector’s total shipments.109 I compile 
this inter-sectoral sales connection variable from the Input-Output accounts data in the 
Survey of Current Business published by the BEA at the US Department of Commerce. The 
BEA prepares the benchmark Input-Output accounts using economics census data collected 
by the Census Bureau. The Input-Output accounts are presented in several tables: standard 
make and use tables and supplementary tables. I compile inter-sectoral sales connections data 
from the use table because the table shows how much value of commodities produced by one 
sector is consumed by another sector.110 Thus, the Input-Output use table captures the 
interdependence between producing and consuming sectors.111   
The BEA publishes Benchmark Input-Output data every five years, and I have 
compiled the benchmark data for the years 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992.112 Since this research 
deals with the period from 1981 to 1990, yearly data other than the benchmark years have 
been interpolated. I have used the method of linear interpolation, assuming that the annual 
changes in the input-output goods market connection between any two sectors are gradual.113 
The Input-Output Benchmark data have their own industry classification codes, and I have 
converted them into two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes because the 
dependent variables (i.e., campaign contributions and petitions) and FDI data are based on 
two-digit SIC codes. 
                                                 
109
 If the value is high, then the upstream sector is highly dependent upon its downstream sector for its output 
sales. If the value is low, the sector is less dependent. The compiled data shows that a given upstream sector has 
various levels of sales dependency with each different downstream sector. 
110
 The dollar value of sales is the producer’s price.   
 
111
 The Input-Output use table has rows of commodities and columns of industries. Each cell in the table 
indicates the value of commodities in each row consumed by an industry in each column.  
   
112
 Source: http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn2/home/benchmark.htm  
 
113
 Interpolated years are 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1990.   
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The inter-sectoral goods market data are basically at a bilateral level (e.g., SIC code 
20’s sales dependency upon SIC code 22, and so on). This research deals with a total of 
eighteen manufacturing sectors in five electoral cycles, and the bilateral inter-sectoral goods 
sales data yield a total of 1,530 bilateral observations (i.e., 306 observations in each election 
period).114 To investigate how sales dependency affects industrial lobbying when FDI flows 
in, the sales dependency variable of a given sector upon its downstream sector is weighted by 
the incoming FDI into the downstream sector. The total of 1,530 bilateral observations, 
though, cannot be directly used to analyze industrial campaign contributions and petitions 
since these dependent variables have only ninety observations (i.e., eighteen manufacturing 
sectors in five election periods). Hence, I have added the values of each individual sector’s 
seventeen bilateral relationships into one observation for each electoral period. This process 
yields a total of ninety observations in the IFDI-effective sales dependency variable. After 
summing up the binary relationships, a given sector’s IFDI-effective sales dependency 
implies how the sector is dependent upon the other seventeen manufacturing sectors for its 
goods sales when the level of IFDI increases in the seventeen sectors. Some sectors have a 
relatively high level of sales dependency, while others have a low level of dependency.      
The FDI-effective sales dependency variable is to investigate how a given sector’s 
sales dependency and increased FDI in its downstream sector affect the former sector’s 
lobbying efforts (Hypothesis 1). In order to test my conditional hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), 
which entails the level of competitiveness of a given sector, the IFDI-effective sales 
dependency variable is weighted by each sector’s measurement of net imports-exposure.115 
                                                 
114
 Each of the eighteen sectors has a total of seventeen bilateral relationships with the other manufacturing 
sectors. Eighteen sectors times seventeen relationships produces 306 cases.    
115
 This is calculated by [(imports/shipments) – (exports/shipments)].  
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This process yields interaction terms between a given sector’s IFDI-effective sales 
dependency and the sector’s net imports-exposure.116   
This research predicts that the IFDI-effective sales dependency variable will be 
positively associated with industrial lobbying efforts (Hypothesis 1). This positive 
association implies that a sector that is highly dependent upon its downstream sector lobbies 
more when more FDI flows into its downstream sector. I expect that the interaction term 
between a sector’s IFDI-effective sales dependency and the sector’s net imports-exposure 
will be positively associated with industry lobbying (Hypothesis 2). This positive relationship 
means that an import-competing sector will lobby more when it is highly dependent upon 
FDI-receiving sectors for its goods sales. 
 Another explanatory variable that measures inter-sectoral goods market relationships 
is a given sector’s purchase dependency upon its upstream sector. The purchase dependency 
represents a given sector’s total purchase of goods from its upstream sector divided by the 
purchasing sector’s total shipments.117 The purchase dependency variable is constructed from 
the use table in Benchmark Input-Output data from the BEA, as in the case of sales 
dependency. In order to investigate how purchase dependency and inward FDI affect 
industrial lobbying, a given sector’s purchase dependency upon each upstream sector is 
weighted by inward FDI in each upstream sector. Finally, a given sector’s total of seventeen 
bilateral purchase dependencies weighted by inward FDI in each upstream sector is summed 
up to yield the given sector’s IFDI-effective purchase dependency upon its seventeen 
upstream sectors.          
                                                 
116
 For specification of interaction models, see Braumoeller (2004) and Brambor et al. (2006).  
117
 This variable measures to what extent the given sector is dependent upon its upstream sector for procurement 
of intermediate input goods. 
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This research predicts that a given sector’s IFDI-effective purchase dependency 
variable will be negatively associated with the sector’s lobbying for trade protection 
(Hypothesis 3). This negative relationship implies that the given sector lobbies less as it is 
more dependent upon its FDI-receiving sectors for its input goods purchase.       
This research employs inter-industry labor mobility as another main explanatory 
variable to analyze how inward FDI in neighboring sectors will affect a given sector’s 
lobbying for trade policies. There are two possible methods to measure labor mobility across 
sectors. One is employing wage differentials across sectors as a proxy for labor immobility, 
and the other is compiling inter-sectoral labor mobility data through a survey of individual 
employees. Both methods are explained below in turn.  
A possible direct measurement of inter-industry labor mobility is wage differentials 
across industries (Krueger and Summers 1988). The assumption is that, if labor is highly 
mobile across sectors, the movement of labor should diminish wage differentials between 
industries because the discrepancies would be arbitraged away. In contrast, if wage 
differentials are substantial, then labor is not highly mobile, but rather specific to the sectors 
in which it is employed. Then why do the wage levels of labor employed in various sectors 
have differentials? It is argued that sectors that employ industry-specific human capital use 
more skilled labor and have higher wage levels than other sectors (Tang and Tseng 2004). 
Along these lines, a study in labor economics suggests that industry-specific and firm-
specific skills generate wage differentials, which create a barrier against inter-industry labor 
mobility (Weinberg 2001). Investigating coalition types of US trade politics in the last two 
centuries, Hiscox (2002) also employs industry wage differentials to measure inter-industry 
labor mobility.  
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Wage differentials may be sufficient to show a barrier for labor mobility, but they are 
not necessary to show such a barrier. The logic of wage differentials to explain labor mobility 
works only for sectors where wage differentials correspond to skill differentials. If two 
industries employ very different skills, but wages in both sectors are similarly high, then the 
wage differential would appear low, but actual inter-sectoral labor mobility would also be 
low. For example, labor employed in the chemical industry and the automobile industry 
would each receive relatively high wages, but the skills for each industry may not be 
compatible with the other. As a result, the level of labor mobility between the two sectors 
could be relatively low. Thus, similar levels of labor compensation in some sectors do not 
necessarily represent a high level of labor mobility between the sectors since each industry 
may employ highly sector-specific skilled labor.      
An alternative way to measure labor mobility is to compile inter-sectoral mobility 
data that shows, for example, how many employees have moved from a given sector to 
another sector in a given time period. The patterns of inter-sectoral labor mobility might be 
relatively stable for years since the specific skills needed for employment in different sectors 
would work as a barrier against unrestrained labor mobility. Thus, labor mobility could be 
high between some sectors and low between others. At the individual industry level, a given 
sector will have a relatively high level of labor mobility if the sector hires labor whose skills 
are compatible with other sectors. In contrast, another sector will have a relatively low level 
of labor mobility if the sector requires highly sector-specific skilled labor. 
I measure a given sector’s level of labor mobility by collecting data on outgoing and 
incoming labor mobility. Outgoing labor mobility indicates how easily labor employed in a 
sector can move to another sector. If types of labor skills are not specific to a sector and are 
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easily applicable to another sector, then the labor can move to the other sector with ease, all 
else constant. In contrast, if types of labor skills are specific to a sector and are not easily 
usable in other sectors, then the labor will have a relatively low level of outgoing mobility. 
Incoming labor mobility refers to how easily labor can be hired in a new sector from another 
sector. A sector that does not require sector-specific skilled labor can recruit new labor with 
relative ease, assuming that there is still some unemployment. By contrast, a sector that 
requires relatively highly sector-specific labor skills cannot recruit labor easily, even if labor 
is released from other sectors.  
A perfect source for labor mobility measurements would be a sector’s annual labor 
employment history data showing how many employees have moved to which sectors, 
retired, migrated, become unemployed, or left the labor force; and how many employees 
have been newly recruited from which sectors, or from outside of the labor force, or have 
immigrated to take work in a given year. To my knowledge, such data does not exist, and the 
only way to trace the labor mobility of a sector is to extract an individual’s employment 
record in two consecutive years from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which interviews 
about 59,000 households.118  
Labor mobility between sectors is captured by comparing the industry in which an 
individual was employed in the previous year to the industry in which the individual is 
employed in the current year. An individual employee provides the information in a given 
year survey.119 The variables used to capture respondents’ employed industries are “Industry 
                                                 
118
 The CPS does not provide longitudinal data, and the same respondents are interviewed no more than two 
consecutive years. 
 
119
 Another way is to collect two consecutive years’ employment records of an individual (i.e., merging two 
consecutive years of CPS data identifying respondents who have been surveyed in the two years). But, 
unfortunately, March 1985 and March 1986 survey data cannot be merged since the household identifiers were 
revised to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents (Madrian and Lefgren 1999). 
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last year” and “Industry last week” in the CPS questionnaires. I measured how many 
respondents had moved from one industry to another (e.g., SIC 20 to 22).120 With this 
process I compiled the total of 306 observations on bilateral inter-industry labor movement in 
each of five Congresses.    
This research covers a total of eighteen manufacturing sectors, and I have extracted 
the CPS employment records of individual respondents who have been employed only in 
these eighteen sectors. I exclude individuals who had been employed in one of the eighteen 
manufacturing sectors in the previous year but moved to a non-manufacturing sector, such as 
agriculture, mining or services; became unemployed; retired, emigrated, or died. Likewise, I 
exclude individuals who had not been in one of the eighteen manufacturing sectors in the 
previous year but moved to one of those sectors in the current year. When measuring labor 
mobility, then, I include only individuals who had been employed in one of the eighteen 
manufacturing sectors in the previous year and stayed in the same sector or moved to one of 
the seventeen other manufacturing sectors. With this approach, I can investigate how labor 
mobility within manufacturing sectors influences industrial trade policy preferences when 
more FDI flows into the US economy. 
A given sector’s outgoing labor mobility represents what portion of labor in a given 
sector has moved toward another sector in a two-year period, divided by the total number of 
individuals who answered that they were employed in the original sector in the previous year. 
I believe it is more appropriate to use total sector employment than total number of workers 
who move to other sectors, mainly because the concept of outgoing labor mobility implies 
how many workers move from a given sector to another in the total number of workers in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
120
 Because the CPS uses its own industry classification codes, I have recoded them into the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes.    
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given sector. For example, if 10,000 individuals answered that they were employed in the 
food industry in 1981, and if two of them moved to a new sector between 1981 and 1982,121 
then the outgoing labor mobility of the food sector to the new sector in the period is 
2/10,000=0.0002. By the same token, other manufacturing sectors’ outgoing labor mobility is 
calculated for the same period.122   
A given sector’s incoming labor mobility represents what portion of labor has moved 
from one sector to the given sector in a two-year period, divided by the total number of 
individuals who answered in the CPS that they were employed in the given sector in the 
second year. For example, if 5,000 were employed in the chemical industry in the year 1982, 
and if five of them had actually moved from another sector to the chemical sector between 
1981 and 1982, then the incoming labor mobility of the chemical industry from another 
industry in the period is 5/5,000=0.001. By the same token, incoming labor mobility in each 
of the other manufacturing sectors is calculated for the same period.123  
One problem related to the measurement of outgoing labor mobility is that a given 
sector that is contracting overall will be more likely to shed labor and will have a higher 
score on this measure than a sector that is not contracting, all other factors being equal. By 
the same token, an expanding sector may draw labor from other sectors and may have a 
higher score on the incoming labor mobility measurement than a sector that is not expanding, 
                                                 
121
 This research uses CPS data from March, and the labor is supposed to have moved to another sector between 
April of the previous year and March of the following year.   
122
 The same procedures are used for the other election periods.  
 
123
 The same procedures are taken for the other election periods. 
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all else being constant. To solve this problem, this research uses total industry employment as 
a control variable.124   
The outgoing labor mobility of a given sector is weighted by inward foreign direct 
investment in another sector to which some of the given sector’s labor has moved in a given 
period. The interaction term represents how a given sector’s outgoing labor mobility and 
inward FDI in the other sector interact. By the same token, a given sector’s incoming labor 
mobility is weighted by the inward FDI in another sector from which some of the given 
sector’s labor moves in during a given period. This interaction term indicates how a given 
sector’s incoming labor mobility and inward FDI in the other sector interact. As in the case 
of a given sector’s sales (or purchase) dependency upon another sector, a given sector’s 
outgoing (or incoming) labor mobility has a total of seventeen bilateral observations in a 
given period. Hence, I have added a given sector’s seventeen IFDI-effective outgoing labor 
mobility scores, which yields the given sector’s aggregate IFDI-effective outgoing labor 
mobility in a given election period. The same procedures have been used for a given sector’s 
incoming labor mobility.          
The level of IFDI-effective labor mobility of a given sector is calculated by the 
average rate of the sector’s IFDI-effective outgoing and incoming labor mobility in a given 
period. With this approach, the labor mobility variable does not have a direction and is 
considered as an average level of specificity in the labor skills a sector employs. If a sector 
has a relatively high value for labor mobility, then the sector hires less sector-specific and 
thus more mobile labor. If a sector has a relatively low value for labor mobility, then the 
sector employs highly sector-specific and less mobile labor.      
                                                 
124
 The total shipments of a given sector can also control the size of the sector. However, a given sector’s larger 
shipments size over another sector does not necessarily mean the sector with larger shipments size also employs 
more workers.        
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A given sector’s IFDI-effective labor mobility variable should be positively 
associated with the given sector’s lobbying for trade protection. If a sector has a relatively 
high level of labor mobility, the sector is assumed to employ relatively less sector-specific 
skilled labor.125 When other manufacturing sectors receive incoming FDI and pull labor to 
expand production, a given sector with a high level of labor mobility is more likely to lose 
labor and lose profits.126 Experiencing or expecting these negative impacts from inward FDI 
in other sectors, the sector with a high level of labor mobility will lobby more, all other 
factors being constant.  
 
4.2.3 Control Variables  
 
This research employs control variables that are conventionally believed to affect 
industrial trade policy preferences. They include a given sector’s total employment, the 
industry concentration ratio, total shipments, net imports-exposure (net difference between 
imports-exposure and exports-dependence), and sales to federal governments. 
The total employment of a given sector is included in the regression model because it 
normalizes the flows of labor between sectors, controlling labor mobility caused by 
expanding or contracting sectors. Also, the variable represents the size of an industry, which 
is assumed to affect industrial demand for protection. The standard argument suggests that 
bigger industries with a large number of employees get more attention from the government 
and thus are more likely to be active in lobbying activities (Lavergne 1983). Thus, the 
                                                 
125
 The assumption is that less sector-specific labor is more mobile across sectors while more sector-specific 
skilled labor is less mobile, all else being constant. 
126
 This logic is from Jones (1971) and Hiscox (2004). Losing labor usually results in decreased production and 
reduced profits, all else being equal. 
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variable is expected to be positively associated with a given sector’s lobbying activities. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics at the Department of Labor provides annual employment data for 
each industry. Another variable that measures the size of a sector is its total shipments. This 
variable is also expected to have a positive effect on the sector’s lobbying efforts.127 
The industry four-firm concentration ratio is the market share of the four largest firms 
in an industry.128 Thus, it shows the relative size of the four largest firms in relation to the 
industry as a whole. This variable is assumed to be positively associated with a sector’s 
lobbying for protection because highly concentrated industries should be better able to 
overcome the so-called free-rider problem and coordinate their lobbying efforts.129 Industry 
concentration ratio data is available from Census of Manufacturers: Concentration Ratios 
published by the Bureau of the Census at the US Department of Commerce.  
A given sector’s net import-exposure is measured by the net difference between the 
sector’s imports penetration and exports dependency ratios. A sector’s import penetration 
level represented by the ratio of imports in total shipments is predicted to be positively 
                                                 
127
 Regarding the size effects of an industry, Lavergne (1983) hypothesizes that large sectors are more powerful 
in getting protection than small ones in two ways. First, large sectors have economies of scale, which can help 
them to overcome the fixed costs of lobbying. Second, large sectors potentially form the basis of large voting 
blocks, which get more attention from the President or Congressmen in elections. After empirical tests of US 
tariffs, Lavergne finds that large sectors have had more success than small ones in obtaining protection. 
 
128
 Some studies deal with the geographical concentration of industries as well. Busch and Reinhardt (1999) 
argue that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed industries are most likely to receive protection 
from imports. They also argue that for trade-exposed industries, geographic concentration strongly increases the 
formation of common trade policy preferences among workers, employees’ contributions to political 
campaigns, and voter turnout (Busch and Reinhardt 2000). 
 
129
 It is assumed that protection for a sector is a public good. If a sector gets protection, all the firms in the sector 
benefit. Thus, one firm’s consumption of protection does not prevent other firms’ consumption, and once 
protection is provided, it is not excludable if there are no barriers to entry. In this situation, every firm in a 
sector has an incentive to free-ride without contributing lobbying efforts to get protection. Olson (1971) points 
out that because of the free-rider problem, large groups with many members are more likely to fail than smaller 
ones in collectively getting what they want. Following the logic of collective action, this research assumes that 
if a sector has a small number of firms, these firms are more likely to lobby successfully because they can 
overcome the free-rider problem.  
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associated with industrial lobbying for trade protection because a higher level of imports 
considering total industry size is likely to trigger local import-competing producers to 
demand higher protection, all else being constant.130 The exports dependency of a sector 
represented by the ratio of exports in industry total shipments is assumed to be negatively 
related to industrial lobbying for protection because export-oriented sectors are more 
concerned with global markets rather than local markets only. Exporters worry about the 
possibility of retaliation from other countries if trade barriers are set up in the local economy, 
and thus are more likely to advocate the free trade of goods they produce and sell overseas.131 
Since I measure net imports-exposure of a given sector by subtracting exports dependency 
from imports penetration, the variable is predicted to have a positive association with the 
given sector’s lobbying for protection. Shipments, imports, and exports data are available 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).132  
Another control variable is a given sector’s total sales to the federal government, 
which represents the sector’s business closeness to the government. An industry that sells 
heavily to the government is hypothesized to lobby more because of its sensitivity to 
government procurement, all else being constant (Lichtenberg 1989; Zaleski 1992; Hansen et 
al. 2005). The data is available from Census of Manufacturers: Manufacturers’ Shipments to 
Federal Government Agencies published by the Bureau of the Census, the US Department of 
Commerce.133          
                                                 
130
 I measure imports levels rather than changes in levels.   
131
 Because sectors (especially ones producing differentiated products) can simultaneously export and import, 
my model considers import exposure and export dependence separately. 
 
132
 Source: http://www.nber.org/data/  
 
133
 Industrial shipments, imports, exports, and government sales are readjusted to the 1995 US dollar along with 
a dependent variable: industrial campaign contributions. 
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Table 4.1: Dependent, Explanatory and Control Variables and Predicted Signs 
 
Dependent variable: Industrial Campaign Contributions or Petitions Filed with the ITC   
 
Explanatory and Control Variables 
  
Predicted Sign 
Own sector capital mobility 
 
- 
IFDI-effective Sales dependency interacted with net imports-
exposure  
 
+ 
IFDI-effective Sales dependency  
 
+  
IFDI-effective Purchase dependency  
 
- 
IFDI-effective Labor mobility 
 
+ 
Total employment 
 
+ 
Industry concentration ratio 
 
+ 
Shipments 
  
+ 
Net imports-exposure 
  
+ 
Sales to the federal government 
 
+ 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean S.D.134 Minimum Maximum 
Industrial Campaign 
Contributions135 (1995 $)  
90 297,932 386,823 1,541 1,986,588 
Petitions 
 
90 5.43 12.79 0 83 
Own Industry Capital Mobility 
(Shipments) 
90 0.282 0.235 0.027 0.998 
Own Industry Capital Mobility 
(Assets) 
90 0.761 0.89 0.06 4.68 
IFDI-effective Sales Dependency 
interacted with net comparative 
disadvantage (Shipments) 
90 0.0009 0.0017 -0.002 0.0085 
IFDI-effective Sales Dependency 
interacted with net comparative 
disadvantage (Assets) 
90 0.000067 0.00012 -0.000061 0.00069 
IFDI-effective Sales Dependency 
(Shipments) 
90 0.0187 0.0198 0.00015 0.0811 
IFDI-effective Sales Dependency 
(Assets) 
90 0.0436 0.0494 0.0004 0.2448 
IFDI-effective Purchase 
Dependency (Shipments) 
90 0.032 0.022 0.005 0.099 
IFDI-effective Purchase 
Dependency (Assets)  
90 0.059 0.043 0.008 0.215 
IFDI-effective Labor Mobility 
(Shipments) 
90 0.003 0.003 0 0.012 
IFDI-effective Labor Mobility 
(Assets) 
90 0.006 0.007 0 0.031 
Total Employment 
 
90 2081.644 1137.53 270.7 4785 
Concentration  
(Four-firm ratio) 
90 37.57 8.71 19.83 56.68 
Shipments  
(1995 $bn) 
90 89.19 67.92 5.84 330.03 
Net comparative disadvantage 
(Imp/Ship) – (Exp/Ship) 
90 0.1629656 0.216876 0.009082 1.313161 
Government Sales 
(1995 $bn) 
90 6.29 14.48 0 61.72 
 
                                                 
134
 Standard Deviation 
135
 Contributions to candidates who vote for protectionist bills 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TESTING HYPOTHESES 
 
This research employs a total of sixteen regression models to test my hypotheses. 
Eight of them analyze industrial campaign contributions, and the other eight examine 
industrial petitions filed with the International Trade Commission (ITC). Half of the sixteen 
models measure FDI as the total value of assets of affiliates as a proportion of the total value 
of private assets in each US manufacturing industry. The other half measures FDI as the total 
value of the sales of affiliates as a proportion of the total value of all sales in each industry.      
      
5.1 Industrial Campaign Contributions, 1981-1990  
 
5.1.1 FDI Measured as Proportion of Industry Assets 
 
Table 5.1 reports the regression results from analysis of industrial campaign 
contributions. In these models, foreign direct investment is measured at the asset level.  
Models 1 and 2 have interaction terms between IFDI-effective sales dependency variable and 
net imports-exposure. The interaction term is employed to test Hypothesis 2, which is a 
conditional hypothesis. IFDI-effective sales dependency variable in Models 3 and 4 is 
employed to test Hypothesis 1.    
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Table 5.1 Inward FDI (asset) and Industry Campaign Contributions, 1981-1990 
Dependent variable: Industry contributions to Congressional campaigns of protectionist 
candidates 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Own industry Capital 
Mobility a 
-0.13*** 
(0.034) 
-0.132*** 
(0.042) 
-0.131*** 
(0.038) 
-0.133*** 
(0.042) 
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency Interacted with 
Net Imports-exposure b  
-0.167 
(0.347) 
0.146 
(0.622) 
  
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency a 
2.489*** 
(0.754) 
2.941** 
(1.187) 
2.226*** 
(0.516) 
3.158*** 
(0.739) 
IFDI-effective Purchase 
Dependency a 
-1.306* 
(0.71) 
-2.075** 
(0.935) 
-1.463** 
(0.627) 
-1.995** 
(0.863) 
IFDI-effective Labor 
Mobility a 
18** 
(8.658) 
12.9 
(21.3) 
18** 
(8.578) 
11.5 
(20.0) 
Total Employment -41.907 
(34.195) 
-8.287 
(40.9) 
-42.02 
(34.02) 
-8.3 
(40.56) 
Concentration c  
(Four-firm ratio) 
-1.769 
(3.091) 
1.231 
(3.694) 
-1.706 
(3.073) 
1.224 
(3.663) 
Shipments c, d  
 
4.047*** 
(0.728) 
3.861*** 
(0.915) 
4.037*** 
(0.724) 
3.862*** 
(0.908) 
Net Imports-exposure a   
 
0.097 
(0.135) 
0.119 
(0.168) 
0.065 
(0.117) 
0.141 
(0.136) 
Government Sales c, d 
 
14.365*** 
(1.776) 
16.085*** 
(2.104) 
14.421*** 
(1.764) 
16.09*** 
(2.087) 
Observations 90 72 90 72 
Adjusted 
R-squared  
0.78 0.79 0.78 0.79 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%                                                                   
All estimations include constant.  
a Coefficients shown in millions 
b Coefficients shown in billions 
c Coefficients shown in thousands 
d 1995 US billion dollars  
 
Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with period dummies 
Model 2: OLS with lagged independent variables and period dummies 
Model 3: OLS with period dummies and without interaction terms   
Model 4: OLS with lagged independent variables and period dummies and without 
interaction terms 
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A given sector’s inward and outward FDI appears to be negatively associated with 
industry campaign contributions for trade protection. In Models 1 and 3, an increase of one 
standard deviation (0.89) in the portion of a given sector’s capital mobility decreases the 
industry’s campaign contributions by $115,000, all else being equal. The negative effect on 
contributions is also significant in Models 2 and 4, where one-period lagged independent 
variables are employed, allowing extra time for structural changes to affect industrial 
lobbying efforts. These consistent results in Models 1 though 4 confirm the argument in the 
existing literature that increasing cross-border capital mobility should reduce industries’ 
incentives to lobby for protection, because protectionist rents for local firms from local trade 
barriers will be dissipated if cross-border capital mobility increases (Milner 1988; Bhagwati 
1991; Blonigen and Feenstra 1996).  
The interaction term between a given sector’s IFDI-effective sales dependency and 
net imports-exposure does not turn out to be statistically significant in Models 1 and 2. Thus 
Hypothesis 2, which posits that import-competing industries that are highly dependent upon 
FDI-receiving sectors for good sales lobby more, is not empirically supported when FDI is 
measured at the asset level. However, this result does not necessarily mean that a given 
sector’s sales dependency has no impact on industry lobbying. In Models 3 and 4, a given 
upstream sector’s level of sales dependency upon FDI-receiving sectors turns out to be 
positively related to industry campaign contributions. In Model 3, an increase of one standard 
deviation (0.0494) in IFDI-effective sales dependency raises an upstream sector’s campaign 
contributions by $110,000, all else being equal. In Model 4, an upstream sector’s additional 
lobbying is even greater ($156,000). This result means that a sector’s IFDI-effective sales 
dependency in the previous period has a stronger impact on the sector’s campaign 
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contributions in the current period. Hence, a given sector’s IFDI sales dependency has a 
positive effect on industry contributions regardless of the sector’s level of net imports-
exposure, as seen in Models 3 and 4. These results confirm Hypothesis 1, revealing that a 
highly dependent upstream sector lobbies more for protection when foreign investors’ share 
of assets in its neighboring sectors increases, all else being equal.136 When more foreign 
investors participate in the US economy, local upstream firms tend to lobby more for 
protection because new foreign owned firms usually procure input goods from their previous 
sources (such as their parent firms or home country suppliers) rather than the local upstream 
producers. This changing ownership structure in FDI-receiving firms influences their input 
procurement patterns, and this in turn triggers a modification in industry lobbying by 
upstream firms that are highly dependent upon sales to FDI-receiving firms.           
A given downstream sector’s purchase dependency turns out to have a significant 
negative effect on industrial campaign contributions as foreign ownership expands in FDI-
receiving sectors. In Model 1, an increase of one standard deviation (0.043) in the IFDI-
effective purchase dependency variable lowers a downstream sector’s campaign 
contributions by $56,000, all other factors being constant. The significant negative effect 
becomes stronger in Models 2 and 4, where lagged independent variables are employed, 
allowing extra time for structural changes to affect industrial lobbying efforts. The results in 
Models 1 through 4 confirm Hypothesis 3: the more a downstream sector purchases from 
FDI-receiving sectors, the less the downstream sector lobbies for protection, all else being 
                                                 
136
 In an interaction model, a constitutive term’s coefficient is the term’s effect on the model’s dependent 
variable when the value of another constitutive term is zero (Brambor et al. 2006). Thus, the coefficients in the 
IFDI-effective sales dependency variable in Models 1 and 2 indicate the effect of the variable on industry 
campaign contributions when the level of a sector’s net imports-exposure is zero. Hence the statistically 
significant coefficients in Models 1 and 2 do not represent the average effect of IFD-effective sales dependency 
on industry campaign contributions.   
 83  
 
 
equal. Increased goods production after greenfield inward FDI will reduce the price of input 
goods. This lowered price of input goods will strengthen the competitiveness of downstream 
sectors. Then the sectors in turn have less incentive to lobby, all else being equal. 
On the whole, the regression results of a given sector’s sales and purchase 
dependency variables imply that inter-sectoral business relationships affect industrial 
campaign contributions when the portion of foreign ownership expands in US industries. 
Interestingly, sales and purchase dependencies of a given sector affect industrial lobbying in 
different ways. An upstream sector lobbies more when foreign firms own more assets in their 
downstream sectors, who tend to import input goods sources other than the domestic 
upstream sector. Meanwhile, a downstream sector lobbies less, since the expansion of foreign 
ownership in its upstream sectors will benefit the domestic downstream sector by providing 
additional goods at lowered price or higher quality goods at the same price.137 Thus the 
regression results suggest that a given sector’s political activities are influenced by its goods 
market relationships with other sectors, all else being equal.       
A given sector’s labor mobility appears to have a relatively marginal positive effect 
on the sector’s campaign contributions when foreign owned assets increase in other 
manufacturing sectors. In Models 1 and 3, an increase of one standard deviation (0.007) in 
the IFDI-effective labor mobility variable raises industry contributions by over $126,000, all 
else being constant. This confirms Hypothesis 4: the higher a sector’s labor mobility, the 
more the sector lobbies for protection when more FDI flows into other sectors, all other 
factors being equal. A sector with a higher level of labor mobility lobbies more than another 
sector with a lower level of mobility when more FDI flows into neighboring sectors. Hence 
                                                 
137
 An assumption is that higher-quality goods are produced as a result of more severe competition between 
foreign and local firms after inward FDI.     
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labor should be treated as a sector-specific factor rather than a uniformly mobile or immobile 
one.      
Total industry shipments appear to have a significant positive effect on contributions, 
as shown in Models 1 through 4. Meanwhile, total industry employment does not seem to 
have a significant relationship with industry campaign contributions.   
Industry sales to federal agencies appear to have a strong positive effect on campaign 
contributions, as shown in Models 1 through 4. An increase in federal sales of $14 billion 
lifts contributions by $88,500 in Model 1, all else being equal. This finding shows that 
sectors that have closer business relationships with the federal government tend to lobby 
more, ceteris paribus. Industry concentration ratio and net imports-exposure do not show any 
significant impact on industry campaign contributions.     
 
5.1.2 FDI Measured as Proportion of Industry Shipments 
 
In this section, I analyze industry campaign contributions while employing a measure 
of FDI based on the proportion of shipments of foreign affiliates in total industry shipments. 
Table 5.2 reports the results.   
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Table 5.2 Inward FDI (shipments) and Industry Campaign Contributions, 1981-1990 
Dependent variable: Industry contributions to Congressional campaigns of protectionist 
candidates 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Own industry Capital 
Mobility a 
-0.505*** 
(0.13) 
-0.595*** 
(0.163) 
-0.596*** 
(0.127) 
-0.691*** 
(0.157) 
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency Interacted with 
Net Imports-exposure b  
0.0364** 
(0.0167) 
0.0364* 
(0.02) 
  
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency a 
3.578** 
(1.567) 
5.425** 
(2.104) 
5.95*** 
(1.158) 
7.934*** 
(1.589) 
IFDI-effective Purchase 
Dependency a 
-1.503 
(1.161) 
-2.439 
(1.497) 
-2.34** 
(1.123) 
-3.287** 
(1.445) 
IFDI-effective Labor 
Mobility a 
52.1** 
(20.6) 
30.5 
(42.3) 
48.0** 
(21.0) 
13.2 
(41.9) 
Total Employment -32.012 
(30.212) 
-8.584 
(36.596) 
-40.206 
(30.714) 
-14.86 
(37.087) 
Concentration c  
(Four-firm ratio) 
2.776 
(2.937) 
6.015 
(3.61) 
3.79 
(2.971) 
6.883* 
(3.642) 
Shipments c, d  
 
3.934*** 
(0.625) 
3.89*** 
(0.783) 
3.911*** 
(0.640) 
3.867*** 
(0.797) 
Net Imports-exposure a   
 
-0.067 
(0.12) 
-0.016 
(0.142) 
0.019 
(0.116) 
0.07 
(0.136) 
Government Sales c, d 
 
13.149*** 
(1.661) 
15.021*** 
(1.972) 
13.662*** 
(1.685) 
15.485*** 
(1.99) 
Observations 90 72 90 72 
Adjusted 
R-squared  
0.81 0.81 0.8 0.81 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%                                                                   
All estimations include constant.  
a Coefficients shown in millions 
b Coefficients shown in billions 
c Coefficients shown in thousands 
d 1995 US billion dollars  
 
 
Model 5: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with period dummies 
Model 6: OLS with lagged independent variables and period dummies 
Model 7: OLS with period dummies and without interaction terms   
Model 8: OLS with lagged independent variables and period dummies and without 
interaction terms 
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Cross-border capital mobility measured as affiliates’ portion of total industry 
shipments turns out to have a strong negative effect on industrial campaign contributions. In 
Model 5, an increase of one standard deviation (0.235) in the portion of a given sector’s 
capital mobility decreases the industry’s contributions by $117,000, all else being equal.138 
On the whole, the results in Models 1 through 8 affirm that increasing cross-border capital 
mobility reduces industry campaign contributions.139 Local firms will have less incentive to 
lobby for protection, because protectionist rents are dissipated once foreign firms also 
produce locally (Chase 1998). America-based MNCs and US affiliates of foreign firms will 
not lobby for protection because trade barriers would harm those firms’ intra-firm trade with 
their foreign affiliates or parent firms.  
The interaction term between IFDI-effective sales dependency and net imports-
exposure is statistically significant in Models 5 and 6, and this result confirms Hypothesis 2: 
a given import-competing upstream sector lobbies more as it becomes more dependent upon 
its FDI-receiving sectors, all else being equal. Figure 5.1 shows the relationships shown in 
Model 5. 
                                                 
138
 The size of the negative impact is almost the same as that of asset-measured FDI, as shown in Model 1. 
 
139
 This finding contrasts to that of Hiscox (2004). In his analysis, the negative association is not confirmed.   
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Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of IFDI-effective Sales Dependency on Industry Lobbying 
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Vertical axis: Marginal effect of IFDI-effective sales dependency on industry lobbying 
 
 
 
When a given upstream sector is export-oriented (i.e., if the value of the horizontal 
axis is -0.1 in Figure 5.1), the sector reduces lobbying efforts when foreign-owned firms gain 
market share in downstream sectors, all else being equal. However, when an upstream sector 
is import competing (i.e., if the value of the horizontal axis is positive), the sector lobbies 
more when foreign firms produce and sell more goods in FDI-receiving sectors, all else being 
equal. These results confirm that sales dependency of an import-competing upstream sector 
has an effect on industry lobbying when the portion of market share by US affiliates of 
foreign firms increases.  
An interesting finding is that an upstream sector’s competitiveness (i.e., net imports-
exposure) influences industry campaign contributions only when inward FDI is measured at 
the shipments level (i.e., Models 5 and 6) and not in the assets-based Models 1 and 2. This 
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contrasting result implies that an import-competing upstream sector is more sensitive to 
increasing foreign shipments than expanding foreign ownership per se. Since assets might 
change hands without any alteration in production or sales patterns, this result is not 
particularly surprising, but it does suggest that lobbying is more sensitive to events in the 
goods market than in the capital market.140  
An upstream sector’s sales dependency upon FDI-receiving sectors seems to have a 
strong positive impact on industry contributions, as shown in Models 7 and 8. This result 
affirms Hypothesis 1, as in the cases of Models 3 and 4. The sales dependency variable’s 
impact is highly significant (at 99%) in all models (Models 3, 4, 7 and 8). Thus, upstream 
sector’s sales dependency has a significant impact on industry lobbying when foreign firms 
participate in the US economy – either by increasing asset ownership or by engaging in local 
production and selling more goods in American market. On the whole, more inward FDI 
seems to have a substantial negative demand shock to local upstream sectors, who in turn 
resort to more protectionist lobbying.               
When foreign firms’ local production and sales increase in FDI-receiving sectors, a 
given downstream sector’s purchase dependency appears to have a significant negative effect 
on industrial contributions, as shown in Models 7 and 8.141 This result affirms Hypothesis 3, 
along with Models 1 through 4. The size of the impact by purchase dependency variable 
upon campaign contributions is smaller when FDI is measured at the shipments level than at 
                                                 
140
 When an upstream sector’s net imports-exposure is zero, the sector’s sales dependency appears to have a 
significant positive effect on contributions as foreign-owned local firms gain market share in downstream 
sectors. In Model 5, an increase of one standard deviation (0.0017) in the IFDI-effective sales dependency 
raises industry campaign contributions by $6,000, all else being equal. 
 
141
 Even though the sign of the coefficients is negative as predicted, the coefficients are not statistically 
significant in Models 5 and 6. 
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the asset level.142 This difference implies that downstream sectors are more sensitive to 
changes in ownership structure than to changes in market share between US- and foreign-
owned firms in FDI-receiving sectors.  
The level of labor mobility’s positive effect on industrial campaign contributions 
turns out to be valid again. In Model 5, an increase of one standard deviation (0.003) in the 
IFDI-effective labor mobility variable raises industry contributions by $156,000, all else 
being constant. The positive association is also found in Model 7, and these results imply that 
the level of sector-specificity of labor varies across sectors. Thus the so-called factor 
approaches, which consider labor as a uniformly mobile factor across sectors, are not 
empirically supported in this research. Rather, the findings of this research reveal that a more 
realistic approach in trade politics should treat labor as a relatively specific factor to an 
industry in which it is employed.     
As for other control variables, total industry shipments and industry sales to federal 
governments turn out to be positively associated with industrial lobbying, as predicted.  
Overall, the analysis of industry campaign contributions confirms my theory that 
inter-industry business connections, as well as labor mobility, mediate the impact of inward 
foreign direct investment on industry lobbying. The empirical findings of this research 
buttress the conventional wisdom that economic globalization affects the fortunes of 
domestic actors in various ways, creating new winners and losers in those processes (Frieden 
and Rogowski 1996; Garret 1998; Kahler and Lake 2003).        
      
                                                 
142
 In Model 3, an increase of one standard deviation (0.043) in the IFDI-effective purchase dependency 
variable lowers a downstream sector’s campaign contributions by $63,000, all else being constant. In Model 7, 
an increase of one standard deviation (0.022) in the IFDI-effective purchase dependency variable decreases 
contributions by $51,000, all else being constant 
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 5.2 Petitions to the International Trade Commission (ITC), 1981-1990 
 
This research employs the number of industry petitions filed with the International 
Trade Commission (ITC) as another measurement of industry lobbying for trade protection. 
Industrial petitions are used specifically to request a modification of trade policies after local 
industries have been harmed or threatened by foreign competitors’ unfair trade practices. 
Because of the petitions’ specific purpose, not all industries filed a petition in every election 
period during the 1980s. My data have a total of ninety observations (i.e., eighteen sectors in 
five Congresses), and only forty-six observations have one or more cases of petitions. By 
contrast, all industries have made campaign contributions of varying amounts in the same 
decade. I believe that investigating industry lobbying both through campaign contributions 
and petitions will strengthen the validity of my theory if both analyses support my 
hypotheses.    
 
5.2.1 FDI Measured as Proportion of Industry Assets 
 
Table 5.3 reports the results of petitions analysis with asset-measured FDI.143 
                                                 
143
 As in the analysis of campaign contributions, this research investigates petitions employing both asset- and 
shipments-measured FDI. 
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Table 5.3 Inward FDI (asset) and Industry ITC Petitions, 1981-1990 
 
Dependent variable: Number of petitions filed with ITC by industries 
 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Own industry 
Capital Mobility  
 
0.21 
(0.456) 
-0.17 
(0.477) 
0.2 
(0.455) 
-0.171 
(0.476) 
IFDI-effective 
Sales Dependency 
Interacted with Net 
Imports-exposure a  
0.951 
(3.699) 
0.28 
(4.147) 
  
IFDI-effective 
Sales Dependency 
 
24.447** 
(9.97) 
25.95** 
(10.416) 
26.471*** 
(6.235) 
26.509*** 
(6.359) 
IFDI-effective 
Purchase 
Dependency  
-16.502* 
(8.41) 
-16.789** 
(7.323) 
-15.77** 
(7.88) 
-16.692** 
(7.184) 
IFDI-effective 
Labor Mobility  
138.299 
(106.825) 
329.379* 
(197.138) 
135.2 
(106.362) 
324.83* 
(185.226) 
Total Employment 0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
Concentration 
(four-firm ratio) 
0.117*** 
(0.04) 
0.113*** 
(0.035) 
0.116*** 
(0.04) 
0.113*** 
(0.035) 
Shipments b -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Net Imports-
exposure 
-1.791 
(2.114) 
-1.57 
(1.81) 
-1.454 
(1.613) 
-1.494 
(1.408) 
Government Sales b  -0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.02) 
Observations 90 72 90 72 
Log likelihood -190.44 -163.89 -190.47 -163.89 
Pseudo R-squared 0.097 0.108 0.097 0.108 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%                                                                   
All estimations include constant.  
a Coefficients shown in thousands  
b
 1995 US billion dollars 
 
Model 9: Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) with period dummies 
Model 10: NBRM with lagged independent variables and period dummies 
Model 11: NBRM with period dummies and without interaction terms 
Model 12: NBRM with lagged independent variables and period dummies and without 
interaction terms
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A sector’s own cross-border capital mobility measured at the asset level appears to 
have no significant impact on industry petitions. This result contrasts with the variable’s 
significant negative impacts on campaign contributions in Models 1 through 8.144 Thus a high 
level of cross-border capital mobility weakens industry campaign contributions, but not 
necessarily industry petitions.145        
Even though the direction of the coefficient is positive as predicted, the interaction 
term between IFDI-effective sales dependency and net imports-exposure does not show any 
statistical significance, and thus the conditional hypothesis, Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. 
This is consistent with the result in the analysis of industry campaign contributions when 
asset-measured FDI is employed. Thus the pattern of lobbying activities by import-
competing sectors does not seem to be significantly influenced by changes in the ownership 
structure between US- and foreign firms.  
An upstream sector’s higher level of sales dependency upon FDI-receiving sectors 
seems to influence the upstream sector to file more petitions, all else being equal. In Model 
11, for an increase of one standard deviation (0.00012) in the IFDI-effective sales 
dependency, the expected count of petitions increases by 3.35, all else being equal.146 The 
sales dependency’s positive coefficients in Models 11 and 12 show that, regardless of net 
imports-exposure, a highly dependent upstream sector tends to lobby more when foreign 
                                                 
144
 As discussed in Chapter Two, Chase (1998) and Zeng and Sherman (2003) showed contrasting regression 
results in their analyses of industry petitions in the era of increased cross-border capital mobility. Chase (1998) 
found a negative relationship between capital mobility and industry petitions, but Zeng and Sherman (2003) 
found that the relationship between the two to be positive. 
     
145
 If legislation is a slow path to take, then firms that can exit quickly will not bother to lobby. But if petitions 
are relatively quick, then even firms that can exit quickly will find it rational to file petitions. I thank Timothy 
McKeown for pointing this out.    
 
146
 For an interpretation of coefficients in a negative binomial regression model, see J. Scott Long and Jeremy 
Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using STATA (STATA Press, 2003).  
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owned-asset increases in the US, all else being equal. Thus upstream sectors’ sales 
dependency seems to have a significant impact on both types of industry lobbying – 
campaign contributions and petitions, and this result strongly confirms Hypothesis 1.       
A given downstream sector that is highly dependent upon FDI-receiving sectors 
seems to file fewer petitions, all else being equal. In Model 9, an increase of one standard 
deviation (0.043) in the IFDI-effective purchase dependency variable reduces industry 
petitions by 0.5, all else remaining constant. The negative effect is also significant in Models 
10 through 12. These consistent negative associations between purchase dependency and 
industry petitions support Hypothesis 3. Along with the results in the analysis of industry 
campaign contributions, these empirical results confirm that downstream sectors tend to 
lobby less when the portion of foreign-owned assets increases in upstream industries. Thus, 
downstream sectors may favor more inward FDI into the US, because greenfield foreign 
direct investment could benefit the final goods producers by providing more intermediate 
goods at a lower price. Hence, US downstream sectors can be winners when more foreign 
firms participate in upstream sectors.        
The significant and positive coefficient in the IFDI-effective labor mobility variable 
in Models 10 and 12 supports Hypothesis 4: the higher a sector’s labor mobility, the more it 
lobbies when other sectors receive more FDI, all else being equal. This result shows that the 
level of inter-industry labor mobility affects industry lobbying, and this fact implies that the 
explanatory power of any approach that assumes labor is uniformly mobile across sectors, is 
limited.  
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Industry four-firm concentration ratio appears to have highly significant positive 
effects on industry petitions, as shown in Models 9 through 12.147 Industry total employment 
turns out to be positively associated with industry petitions, as shown in Models 9 and 11. An 
industry that has a large number of employees gets more attention from the government 
because the fortunes of that industry could be closely related to the unemployment rate of the 
society. In this case, an industry with a large number of employees would tend to demand 
more protection, all else being equal.       
Industry total shipments and sales to the federal government appear to have no 
positive impact on industry petitions. By contrast, the two variables have shown substantial 
impact on campaign contributions, as shown in Models 1 through 8. Shipments would be 
related to filings only if small (or large) industries tended to be import-competing. Sales to 
the federal government would be related to filings only if those highly dependent on such 
sales were import-competing. By contrast, campaign contributions are made to achieve a 
wide variety of policy benefits, not just trade protection.      
The overall results for the control variables imply that factors that affect industry 
campaign contributions and those that affect industry petitions are different. Total industry 
shipments and sales to the federal government matter in the analysis of campaign 
contributions. Meanwhile, industry total employment and industry concentration turn out to 
be significant in the analysis of industry petitions. Since campaign contributions represent 
more general industry lobbying efforts to get favorable government policies, the shipment 
size and the level of closeness to the federal government will critically affect this type of 
political activity. Meanwhile, petitions to the ITC are a more specific type of industry 
                                                 
147
 In Model 9, for a change of one standard deviation (8.71) in industry concentration, the expected petitions 
count increases by 2.76, all else staying constant. 
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lobbying. This fact may well explain why industry concentration ratio, which affects the 
possibility of firm-level coordination, matters in the analysis of industry petitions, not in the 
analysis of campaign contributions.       
         
5.2.2 FDI Measured as Proportion of Industry Shipments 
  
Table 5.4 reports the regression results of analysis of industry petitions using 
shipments-measured FDI.   
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Table 5.4 Inward FDI (shipments) and Industry ITC Petitions, 1981-1990 
 
Dependent variable: Number of petitions filed with ITC by industries 
 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Own industry Capital 
Mobility  
 
3.25** 
(1.327) 
2.18 
(1.472) 
1.734 
(1.293) 
1.047 
(1.406) 
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency Interacted 
with Net Imports-
exposure a  
0.429*** 
(0.129) 
0.268* 
(0.139) 
  
IFDI-effective Sales 
Dependency 
18.203 
(15.93) 
30.784 
(18.856) 
62.1*** 
(12.97) 
59.068*** 
(13.38) 
IFDI-effective Purchase 
Dependency  
-8.377 
(12.368) 
-9.923 
(12.373) 
-19.77 
(13.18) 
-17.865 
(12.058) 
IFDI-effective Labor 
Mobility  
479.048** 
(237.392) 
398.796 
(393.917) 
271.675 
(252.709) 
178.018 
(397.552) 
Total Employment 0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
Concentration  
(four-firm ratio) 
0.092*** 
(0.035) 
0.095*** 
(0.035) 
0.11*** 
(0.038) 
0.106*** 
(0.037) 
Shipments b -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.01 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
Net Imports-exposure -2.7 
(1.903) 
-1.4 
(1.612) 
-0.229 
(1.562) 
-0.253 
(1.474) 
Government Sales b  -0.039** 
(0.018) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
Observations 90 72 90 72 
Log likelihood -183.12 -162.99 -188.64 -164.82 
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.113 0.105 0.103 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%                                                                   
All estimations include constant.  
a Coefficients shown in thousands  
b
 1995 US billion dollars 
 
Model 13: Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) with period dummies 
Model 14: NBRM with lagged independent variables and period dummies 
Model 15: NBRM with period dummies and without interaction terms 
Model 16: NBRM with lagged independent variables and period dummies and without 
interaction terms 
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In Model 13, unlike in any other regression models, a given sector’s own capital 
mobility turns out to be positively correlated with industry petitions. One possible 
explanation could be tariff-jumping FDI (Hamada 1974). When local firms file more 
petitions in a given sector, foreign firms engage in more direct investment to jump over 
protectionist barriers that are anticipated and realized. Thus, foreign investment increases in a 
highly protected sector. However, in the analysis of campaign contributions (i.e., Models 1 
through 8), the same variable has significant negative effects on industry lobbying. Thus 
increasing own sector capital mobility may reduce industry lobbying for more general 
purpose (i.e., campaign contributions), but not necessarily industry petitions.           
In Models 13 and 14, the interaction term between a given upstream sector’s IFDI-
effective sales dependency and net imports-exposure has a significant impact on industry 
petitions. Thus, an import-competing upstream sector tends to file more petitions when 
foreign firms gain market share in FDI-receiving sectors, all else being equal. This result 
affirms Hypothesis 2. The interaction term’s significant impacts are present in the analyses of 
both campaign contributions and petitions when FDI is measured at the shipments level (i.e., 
Models 5, 6, 13 and 14). When FDI is measured at the asset level, though, the interaction 
term is not significant (i.e., Models 1, 2, 9 and 10). These contrasting results imply that 
import-competing upstream sectors care more about changes in market share than ownership 
structure between foreign and US firms in FDI-receiving sectors. Since not all foreign assets 
are used for goods production, a given import-competing upstream sector may be more 
sensitive to changes in market share than in ownership structure of industry assets.       
Regardless of industry competitiveness, a highly dependent upstream sector appears 
to file more petitions when foreign firms gain market share in FDI-receiving sectors, all else 
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being equal. This is shown by statistically significant positive coefficients in the IFDI-
effective sales dependency variable in Models 15 and 16. Thus Hypothesis 1 is confirmed 
both in the analyses of campaign contributions (Models 3, 4, 7 and 8) and of petitions 
(Models 11, 12, 15, and 16). Moreover, upstream sectors’ responses are statistically 
significant when FDI is measured both at the shipments and asset levels. This comprehensive 
result is plausible because my theory posits that both greenfield and merger and acquisition 
FDI in the US can trigger a negative demand shock to local upstream sectors, who in turn 
resort to lobbying for protection for compensation.      
Even though the directions of the coefficients are negative, as predicted, a given 
downstream sector’s IFDI-effective purchase dependency shows no statistical significance. 
This result contrasts with the result in the analysis of asset-measured FDI (i.e., Models 9 
through 12) in which the variable has a significant negative effect on industry petitions. In 
cases of petition filings, a downstream sector seems to be more responsive to a higher portion 
of foreign-owned assets than to changes in market share between American and foreign firms 
in FDI-receiving sectors.            
A given sector’s labor mobility turns out to have a moderate positive effect on 
industrial petitions, as predicted, when foreign sales increases in another sector. This is 
shown only in Model 13. Although limited, this positive impact implies that a sector with 
higher labor mobility tends to lobby more in the era of higher cross-border capital flows. In 
Chapter Three, my theory posits that not all types of FDI trigger labor mobility between 
industries – only greenfield FDI does. Thus the relatively smaller impact of the labor 
mobility variable on industry petitions could be reasonable when we consider that fact that 
most FDI was merger and acquisitions during the 1980s. Another explanation for this could 
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be the specific conditions for petition filings. Even after a given sector loses labor to sectors 
that receive greenfield investment, the labor-losing sector would file a petition only when 
foreign exporters commit unfair trade practices.  
Overall empirical results strongly confirm my theory that inter-industry business and 
labor market relationships have significant impacts on the political activities of industries in 
the demand side of trade politics. The theoretical implications of the main findings of this 
research will be discussed in Chapter Six.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Main Findings  
 
This research found that inter-sectoral goods market relationships, as well as inter-
sectoral labor mobility, did influence the patterns of industry lobbying for trade protection 
when foreign direct investment flowed into the US during the 1980s. The size and pattern of 
impacts from the structure of inter-industry goods and labor market relationships upon 
industry lobbying are various across variables and models. Most importantly, two types of 
inter-industry goods market connections (i.e., upstream sectors’ sales dependency and 
downstream sectors’ purchase dependency) show dissimilar impacts on industry lobbying.  
Upstream sectors’ response to inward FDI in their neighboring sectors turns out to be 
largely substantial. Responding to a higher level of inward FDI in neighboring sectors, any 
highly dependent upstream sector lobbies more, and this empirical finding strongly supports 
Hypothesis 1. It is reasonable to have this considerably significant result, because both 
merger and acquisition and greenfield FDI into the US may generate a negative demand 
shock to upstream sectors. Once foreign firms gain market share and procure input goods 
from their previous sources, such as their parent firms or home country suppliers, US 
upstream sectors that are highly dependent upon local market will have a negative demand 
shock. The upstream sectors then lose and resort to lobbying for protection against imports. 
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An important implication of this finding is that even competitive upstream sectors may seek a 
political solution when they are highly dependent upon FDI-receiving sectors and thus a 
negative demand shock is critical to their business fortunes.     
Import-competing upstream sectors seem to lobby more (than other sectors) when 
they receive a positive demand shock after greenfield foreign investment increases in their 
neighboring sectors. This finding supports Hypothesis 2. When FDI-receiving sectors 
purchase more input goods to expand production, import-competing upstream sectors will 
have a higher stake to block imports, all else being equal. Interestingly, the empirical 
evidence is valid only when inward FDI is measured at the shipments level, not at the assets 
level. This empirical result may be reasonable because not all foreign-owned assets are 
related to goods production in the US. Another explanation for the relatively modest 
empirical support to Hypothesis 2 lies in my theory that posits only greenfield-type FDI 
generates a positive demand shock to upstream sectors. In fact, the majority type of inward 
FDI into the US during the 1980s was merger and acquisitions.   
Downstream sectors tend to lobby less when more inward FDI flows into their 
neighboring sectors, and this empirical finding affirms Hypothesis 3. Increased local 
production of intermediate input goods after greenfield-type FDI will lower the price of the 
input goods, all else being equal. Lower priced input goods benefit downstream sectors, 
which can save production costs. In addition, downstream sectors will also benefit from high-
quality input goods after more severe competition between local and foreign firms that also 
engage in local production. In this situation, downstream sectors will have less incentive to 
lobby for protection because their final goods have become more competitive than before.  
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As shown, upstream and downstream sectors show dissimilar responses to inward 
FDI in neighboring sectors. The directions of responses are opposite. After inward FDI, 
upstream sectors lobby more in case they receive a negative demand shock, while 
downstream sectors lobby less in case they receive a positive supply shock. The different 
responses are caused by a given sector’s position in inter-industry business connections.  
A given sector that has a higher level of labor mobility lobbies more when inward 
FDI increases in other sectors. This empirical finding affirms Hypothesis 4. This research 
assumes that different types and level of labor skills in various sectors will work as a barrier 
against inter-industry labor mobility. A sector that has a relatively high level of labor 
mobility will be more likely to lose labor when other sectors receive greenfield FDI, expand 
production, and pull labor from other sectors. The labor-losing sector will then lobby for 
protection against imports to compensate for its loss. Impacts from inter-industry labor 
mobility upon industry lobbying are relatively marginal because only greenfield FDI pulls 
labor from other sectors and induces labor-losing industries to lobby more. The empirical 
finding of this research implies that the level of inter-industry labor mobility does influence 
industry lobbying when more FDI flows into neighboring sectors.    
 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
This research contributes to the international political economy (IPE) literature in 
several ways. First, during the last several decades, researchers have dealt with how given 
trade barriers trigger cross-border capital flows, as shown in the discussion of tariff-jumping 
FDI or tariff-threat-defusing FDI. Yet relatively few studies have examined how increasing 
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cross-border capital flows affect the trade politics of a domestic society. In an effort to fill the 
gap, this research has investigated how inward FDI influenced lobbying patterns of US 
industries during the 1980s. The empirical findings of this research confirm that cross-border 
capital flows affect the patterns of industry lobbying in a domestic society, implying that 
foreign direct investment and local trade politics are not independent, but closely interrelated. 
Foreign direct investment affects the demand side of trade politics because the investment 
could change business environments and fortunes of industries, who in turn adjust their 
lobbying activities. Changing business environments include modification in the structure of 
ownership and goods production between foreign and US-owned firms.         
Second, to my knowledge, no existing literature has systematically analyzed inter-
industry goods market structure to investigate the relationships between international capital 
flows and trade politics. Endogenous trade theories have paid attention only on either factoral 
or sectoral approaches, emphasizing mobility (or specificity) of factors across sectors within 
an economy. Factoral approaches suggest that capital and labor have contrasting interests in 
trade politics because both factors are assumed to be freely mobile across sectors. Sectoral 
approaches, by contrast, suggest that capital is not mobile, but specific to a sector where it is 
employed, and thus import-competing and export-oriented sectors have contrasting interests 
in trade politics. Thus, sectoral approaches assume that a given sector’s competitiveness over 
imports determines the sector’s position and preferences in the demand side of trade politics.  
This research adds that sectoral approaches should consider not only a given sector’s 
competitiveness, but also the sector’s position in inter-industry structure of goods market 
relationships. When FDI flows in “neighboring” sectors, upstream and downstream sectors 
will modify their lobbying activities, responding to changes in ownership structure and goods 
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production in their “neighboring” sectors. An upstream sector that sells a large portion of its 
shipments to an FDI-receiving sector is highly dependent because the bilateral sales 
connection critically influences the upstream sector’s business fortunes. When foreign firms 
in an FDI-receiving sector procure input goods from their previous sources rather than the 
domestic upstream sector, the highly dependent upstream sector will receive a negative 
demand shock, and thus may resort to lobbying for protection. Therefore, the changes in 
ownership structure in an FDI-receiving sector affect the upstream sector’s lobbying patterns. 
A downstream sector that is highly dependent upon an FDI-receiving sector will receive a 
positive supply shock if greenfield foreign investment changes the structure of goods 
production in the receiving sector. If increased production of inputs lowers the price of the 
goods, the downstream sector may become more competitive, and thus will have less 
incentive to lobby, all else being equal. Therefore, the changes in the structure of goods 
production after FDI reduce the downstream sector’s incentive to lobby. Showing that 
industry lobbying is also influenced by a given industry’s position in inter-industry structure 
of goods market connections, this research expands the area of sectoral approaches.  
Another contribution of this research to the development of sectoral approaches lies 
in its findings about the different levels of labor mobility across sectors. Conventionally, 
sectoral approaches consider labor as a relatively mobile factor across sectors, while capital 
is assumed to be a sector-specific factor and hence immobile. This research assumes that, in 
the real world, there is enough variation in labor mobility. Some sectors may have a 
relatively high level of labor mobility, while other sectors may have a relatively low level of 
labor mobility because highly sector-specific labor skills will be a barrier for uniform labor 
mobility across sectors. The empirical findings of this research reveal that a sector that has a 
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high level of labor mobility lobbies more when other sectors receive greenfield FDI, expand 
production, and pull labor from other sectors, all else being equal. Thus, labor should not be 
considered as a uniformly mobile factor in sectoral approaches. In the studies of trade 
politics, the assumption of various levels of labor mobility will be more empirically accurate.  
Third, this research confirms the conventional wisdom that economic globalization 
processes have distributive effects on societal actors’ welfare: some groups win, but others 
lose (Keohane and Miller 1996). According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, international 
trade makes the owners of an abundant factor of production win, while those of a scarce 
factor lose. After international trade, a country specializes in producing a good that uses the 
country’s abundant factor. The domestic total demand for the country’s abundant factor then 
increases, and this in turn raises the price of the abundant factor. Hence, capital owners in a 
capital abundant country will win after international trade. Meanwhile, the Ricardo-Viner 
theorem suggests that, in a fully open economy without cross-border capital flows, export-
oriented sectors will win and import-competing sectors will lose. Thus, international 
competitiveness of those sectors generates winners and losers.  
This research finds that, in the era of cross-border capital flows, the fault lines 
between winners and losers are more complicated. When more foreign direct investment 
flows into the US, some sectors win while others lose, depending on those sectors’ sales or 
purchase dependencies upon their FDI-receiving “neighboring” sectors. This research 
assumes that inward FDI changes the structure of asset ownership and goods production 
between foreign and local firms in FDI-receiving sectors. The modification of industry 
structure in asset ownership and goods production then generates demand or supply shocks to 
upstream or downstream sectors. Here, inter-industry structure of goods sales connections 
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mediate those demand or supply shocks. Upstream sectors highly dependent upon FDI-
receiving sectors for goods sales receive a massive negative demand shock if new foreign 
firms after investment switch their input sources away from the local upstream sectors. 
Receiving the negative demand shock, the upstream sectors lose. In contrast, downstream 
sectors highly dependent upon FDI-receiving sectors receive a positive supply shock if 
additional goods after greenfield FDI lower the price of those goods. Receiving the positive 
supply shock, the downstream sectors win. Thus, whether a sector could be a winner or a 
loser in the process of economic globalization hinges also on the sector’s position in the 
structure of inter-industry goods sales connections. Broadly, this research affirms that 
economic globalization generates both benefits and costs to various domestic economic 
actors.     
In the international relations (IR) literature, the interactions between domestic and 
international politics have been one of the main issues. One direction is domestic politics’ 
influence on international politics. A given country’s political culture or institutions affect 
the country’s foreign policy decision-making processes. The democratic peace argument is 
an example that posits how democratic norms or institutions of a society play a critical role in 
designing and projecting peaceful foreign policies toward other democratic countries. The 
other direction is international politics’ impacts on domestic politics. Economic openness and 
globalization processes affect the lives of people in a society. Some economic actors gain, 
while other actors lose because economic openness generates benefits and costs to various 
domestic actors. This research revisits the issue of linkage between domestic and 
international politics, and affirms the argument that economic globalization processes 
influence the interest group politics of a domestic society. Even the US, which is still the 
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largest national economy in the world, is not an exception. This finding is important in the 
discussion of the global economy because, as the largest and the most significant actor in 
global economic issues, the US has played and will play a critical role in designing the global 
economic order in the near future. Since US foreign economic policy represents interactions 
between domestic economic actors and political institutions, investigating how globalization 
affects the fortunes and preferences of domestic actors has an important implication to the 
study of US foreign policy.      
In sum, this research contributes to international relations (IR) literature by showing 
that domestic actors experience impacts from economic globalization through the filter of the 
economic power structure among those actors. Interestingly, and importantly, the domestic 
power structure itself is not a given, but is developed by the domestic actors’ own economic 
transactions with each other, as seen in inter-industry goods market connections.  
 
6.3 Data Contributions 
  
I have compiled three new sets of data that may be usable for future research. First, 
inter-sectoral input-output transactions data compiled at the level of two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes can be used for future research that deals with the 
structure of inter-industry goods market connections. Since the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
at the Commerce Department publishes annual Input-Output data, the structure of inter-
industry business connections data can be compiled beyond the 1980s. 
Second, this research contributes to future research by compiling labor mobility data 
across US manufacturing sectors from the Current Population Survey (CPS). To my 
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knowledge, inter-industry labor mobility data at the bilateral industry level has not been 
compiled before, and the labor mobility data may be usable in other social science disciplines 
such as labor economics. 
Third, I have compiled data on two-digit SIC-level industrial campaign contributions 
made only to protectionist candidates for the US House of Representatives from the 
comprehensive industrial contributions data compiled by McKeown and Fordham (2003). 
The sub-data of industrial campaign contributions for trade protection can be used as another 
direct measurement of industry lobbying activities in trade politics, along with industrial 
petitions filed with the International Trade Commissions (ITC), which have been widely used 
to investigate industry lobbying for trade protection in US trade politics. 
 
6.4 Implications for Future Research 
                     
Related to the data availability issue, if campaign contributions data at the industry 
level are compiled for additional decades (i.e., the 1990s and beyond), my theory and 
hypotheses could be reexamined to test their explanatory power beyond the 1980s. Future 
research can be also expanded to include experiences in other countries in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which have received a substantial 
amount of FDI last several decades. With this approach, future research can examine whether 
my theories of inter-industry goods market relationships can be generalized in advanced 
societies where the plural model of interest group politics can be applied.  
Another direction of future research will be to investigate how outward FDI would 
affect US trade politics. Industries will have an incentive to modify their trade policy 
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preferences and lobbying activities if their business fortunes are influenced by the outward 
FDI from their neighboring sectors. For example, when US multinationals in downstream 
sectors move their production facilities overseas, domestic upstream sectors highly 
dependent upon the downstream sectors for goods sales will experience impacts from the 
outward investment. On the one hand, if US multinationals maintain their reliance on US 
upstream suppliers for procurement even after they move overseas, domestic upstream 
sectors will not lose. On the other hand, if US multinationals switch to procure inputs from 
host country suppliers for any reason, US upstream suppliers will lose. In that case, outward 
FDI and inter-industry goods sales structure will induce US suppliers to lobby for 
compensation. Hence, the inter-industry structure of goods sales dependencies deserves 
attention when we investigate outward FDI and home country trade politics.   
The comparison of impacts from greenfield investment and merger and acquisitions 
(M&A) upon trade politics will be another direction for future research. It is usually assumed 
that politicians and workers would welcome greenfield investment since it creates jobs and 
boosts economic growth. In contrast, foreign acquisition of local firms would tend to trigger 
anti-foreign firms sentiment among politicians and workers, who worry about foreign control 
of domestic firms and job loss caused by restructuring of acquired firms. Once the magnitude 
of greenfield investment and M&A in various FDI-receiving countries can be measured, 
researchers can investigate how the two types of FDI would have different impacts upon the 
formation of liberal or protectionist sentiment in trade politics among politicians, mass 
media, and workers.  
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APPENDIX 
Regression Model 
 
Industrial campaign contributions to protectionist candidates or petitions filed with the 
International Trade Commission  
 
= Constant 
+ Own sector capital mobility  
+ IFDI-effective sales dependency interacted with net imports-exposure   
+ IFDI-effective sales dependency 
+ IFDI-effective purchase dependency  
+ IFDI-effective labor mobility  
+ Total employment  
+ Industry concentration ratio  
+ Shipments  
+ Net imports-exposure  
+ Government sales  
+ Period dummies  
+ Residual 
 
Industrial campaign contributions to protectionist candidates:  The dollar amount of 
campaign contributions by a given sector in a given election period to candidates for 
the House of Representatives who vote for protectionist bills  
Petition filed with the International Trade Commission (ITC): Number of petitions filed with 
the ITC for anti-dumping or countervailing duties by a given sector in a given period  
Own sector capital mobility: Inward and outward foreign direct investment of a given sector 
in a given period    
IFDI-effective sales dependency interacted with net imports-exposure: An interaction term 
between a given sector’s measurement of imports-exposure [(imports/shipments) – 
(exports/shipments)] and the sector’s aggregated IFDI-effective sales dependency148 
upon its 17 downstream sectors (the sum of a given sector’s sales dependency 
weighted by incoming foreign direct investment in each of the 17 downstream 
sectors) in a given period 
IFDI-effective sales dependency: A given sector’s aggregated IFDI-effective sales 
dependency upon its 17 downstream sectors (the sum of a given sector’s sales 
dependency weighted by incoming foreign direct investment in each of the 17 
downstream sectors) in a given period 
IFDI-effective purchase dependency: A given sector’s aggregated IFDI-effective purchase 
dependency149 upon its 17 upstream sectors (the sum of a given sector’s purchase 
                                                 
148
 Sales dependency is represented by sales from a given upstream sector to a downstream sector divided by the 
total shipments of the upstream sector  
149
 Purchase dependency is represented by purchase by a given downstream sector from a upstream sector 
divided by the total shipments of the downstream sector 
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dependency weighted by incoming foreign direct investment in each of the 17 
upstream sectors) in a given period 
IFDI-effective labor mobility: A given sector’s aggregated IFDI-effective labor mobility 
between the sector and 17 other sectors (the sum of a given sector’s labor mobility 
weighted by incoming foreign direct investment in each of the 17 other sectors) in a 
given period 
Total employment: Number of total employees of a given sector in a given period  
Industry concentration ratio: A given sector’s four-firm concentration ratio in a given period 
Shipments: Total sales of a given sector in a given period 
Net imports-exposure: A given sector’s level of imports-exposure in international trade 
[(imports/shipments) – (exports/shipments)] in a given period 
Government sales: A given sector’s sales to the federal government in a given period 
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